From the Beginning to Plato

SOCRATES AND THE BEGINNINGS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 317
the general support that this coarse-grained ordering has. Nevertheless, I should not
be taken to suggest that everyone would agree with this method of dividing up the
dialogues. Kahn (see earlier note) argues for a different division among the
dialogues, while unitarians of various sorts have long argued against the utility of
reading the dialogues with reference to their supposed order of composition. See
most recently, Nails [9–59].
13 Vlastos [9.93], 48. The other nine theses that Vlastos lists are roughly: (2)
Socrates m (henceforth the Socrates of the middle dialogues) has an elaborate theory
of separated Forms; Socrates e (henceforth the Socrates of the early dialogues) does
not; (3) Socrates e seeks knowledge elenctically and denies that he has any;
Socrates m seeks demonstrative knowledge and claims to have it; (4) Socrates m has
a tripartite model of the soul; Socrates, does not; (5) Socrates m is a mathematical
expert; Socrates e is not; (6) Socrates, is a populist; Socrates m is an elitist; (7)
Socrates m has an elaborate political theory; Socrates e does not; (8) Socrates m has a
metaphysical grounding for his homoerotic attachments; Socrates e does not; (9) For
Socrates e religion is practical and realized in action; for Socrates m religion is
mystical and realized in contemplation; (10) Socrates e has an adversative
philosophical method, Socrates m a didactic one.
14 Vlastos [9.93] 46.
15 The other theses Vlastos considers in this regard are (3) and (4).
16 Vlastos [9.93], 117 and n. 50. See also [9.93], 49–53. Vlastos labels this his ‘grand
methodological hypothesis’.
17 Each of these theses has had its detractors. Graham [9.29] has recently objected to
the third thesis. Kahn [9.46], Nehamas [9.65], and Beversluis [9.11] have all
objected to the second thesis, primarily because of their scepticism about the
reliability of the Aristotelian testimony. Finally, two different sorts of objections
have been raised to the first thesis. Kahn [9.46] and Nails [9.60] have objected to
seeing any significant difference between the views advanced in the early dialogues
and those advanced in the middle dialogues. Kraut [9.52], Irwin [9.37], Taylor [9.
83] and others have objected to seeing the difference to be as radical as Vlastos
sees it. I find only this last objection to be persuasive, and so would modify
Vlastos’ approach along the lines advocated by Kraut, Irwin and Taylor.
18 Indeed, to some extent by Aristophanes as well. The moral philosophy that can be
found advanced by Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues—as we will see— can easily
be confused with the moral philosophy (if that is the correct name for it) advanced
by the sophists, at least as Socrates/Plato understood the sophists.
19 I am here running roughshod over a number of subtleties of the text that I believe
are peripheral to my present concern. Socrates does not actually ask Protagoras
what he professes to teach, but rather how Hippocrates would be improved or
benefited if he became Protagoras’ pupil. Nor does Protagoras actually answer that
he teaches virtue. Rather Protagoras says that if Hippocrates becomes his pupil,
every day he will go away being better at political expertise (tēn politikēn technēn)
or at being a citizen (politēs); see Socrates’ summation of Protagoras’ answer and
Protagoras’ approval. Nevertheless, Socrates clearly takes Protagoras to be
professing to teach virtue. See Protagoras 320b4–c1.
20 The other argument is that those who possess virtue are unable to pass it on;
Protagoras 319d7–320b3. Another version of this argument can be found at Meno
93a5–94e2.