From the Beginning to Plato

310 FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO
tough skin, thick hair) on the irrational creatures, leaving humans quite
unprovided for (321b6–c1). Prometheus, thereupon, stole the practical wisdom
(sophian) of Hephaestus and Athena—Hephaetus’ expertise (technēn) in
working with fire and Athena’s other expertise 54 —and gave them to humanity. In
this way, according to the story, humans acquired their practical wisdom, but not
yet their political expertise (politikēn). This latter was reserved for Zeus to
supply, who seeing that humans were able to obtain food and shelter, but were
unable to fight against the beasts and to come together in cities, sent Hermes to
distribute to all of humanity conscience and justice (aidō te kai dikēn) —the
political expertise (tēn politikēn technēn). According to this story, then, once
Epimetheus had doled out to the irrational creatures all of the powers fitting and
necessary for survival, 55 other powers or capacities had to be obtained for humans.
Thus, Prometheus gave to them the power of practical wisdom, while Zeus gave
to them the power of political wisdom. In both cases, wisdom or expertise is
presumed to be a power or capacity.
Indeed, the idea that political wisdom or expertise, i.e. the virtues, is a power
or capacity is further supported by the question with which the remainder of the
Protagoras is preoccupied: whether or not the virtues are one. Following
Protagoras’ Great Speech, of which the Prometheus story is a part, Socrates asks
the question which will resolve the one ‘small’ remaining difficulty: are justice,
temperance, wisdom, piety and courage distinct parts of virtue or are they all
different names for one and the same thing (Protagoras 329c6–d1)? Protagoras
responds that this is an easy question to answer: virtue is one thing and justice,
temperance, piety, etc. are its parts. Socrates appeals to the analogies of the parts
of gold and the parts of a face (Protagoras 329d4–8) and asks his question again.
And does each of them [i.e. the parts of virtue] have its own separate
power [dunamin]? When we consider the face, the eye is not like the ear,
nor is its power [dunamis] the same, nor any other part like another in power
[dunamin] or in other ways. Is it the same with the parts of virtue, that
none is like any other, either in itself or in its power [dunamis]? Surely, it
must be, if it corresponds to our example.
(Protagoras 330a4–b2; adapted from Taylor [7.22]) 56
Socrates’ question, then, is—at least in part—whether, according to Protagoras,
political expertise is one power or more.
It may be objected, however, that this last passage especially indicates not that
virtue or political expertise is a power or capacity but that it is that in virtue of
which one has a power or capacity. 57 The suggestion is that an eye stands to its
power just as courage—one of the virtues and so an expertise—stands to its
power. An eye is not the power to see. Rather, it is that in virtue of which an
individual has the power to see. The eye and its power are ontologically distinct.
If we take the analogy to the virtues and expertise strictly, then, we must take the