From the Beginning to Plato

312 FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO
appropriate circumstances to do what it does. A power for Socrates is not the
mere tendency to perform a certain sort of activity, but rather the state of a thing
that results in such activity. 62 Thus, for Socrates, the power is ontologically prior
to the activity the power is associated with. The activities are defined in virtue of
the power that produces them, not vice versa. 63
Second, a power or capacity for Socrates is to be identified by its peculiar
object. For example, in the Charmides, after indicating that since temperance is
knowledge of knowledge it must be a power (dunamis), Socrates infers that it
must be ‘of something’ (tinos einai), citing as examples that the greater has the
power (dunamin) to be of the lesser (168b5–8) and the double the power
(dunamis) to be of the half. Thus, according to Socrates, if there is a double of
itself, then the double will be both double and half of itself. In general, he maintains
that ‘the very thing which has its own power (dunamin) applied to itself will
have to have that nature towards which the power (dunamis) was directed’
(Charmides 168c10–d3; adapted from Sprague trans.). He explains this with the
following examples: since hearing is of sound, hearing would have to be a sound
if it were to be of itself, and since sight is of colour, sight would have to be coloured
if it were of itself. While the details of these passages may be difficult to sort
out, the general idea appears clear enough. Associated with every power is an
object, property, nature or being (ousian). Thus, the powers of the greater, the
double, hearing and sight have as their respective objects the lesser, the half,
sound, and colour. Moreover, the power must always be of this object; if it were
of a different object, it would be a different power. It is only on this assumption
that Socrates can draw his conclusions that if the greater is of itself, then it must
be lesser (as well as greater), if the double is of itself, it must be half (as well as
double) 64 , if hearing is of itself, it must be a sound, and if sight is of itself, it
must be coloured. 65
Thus, since virtue is an expertise, it is a power. As a power it must be
associated with a particular sort of activity and have a specific object. The
activity is evidently virtuous activity 66 , while the object appears to be the good
(and the bad) in light of our earlier discussion. But in saying this we have left out
the cognitive aspect of expertise. For expertise is not just a power; it is a
cognitive power. This cognitive aspect of expertise is manifested in Socrates’
view that expertise is infallible, inerrant or luck-independent.
Consider, for example, Socrates’ claim in the first protreptic of the Euthydemus
that having included wisdom in his list of goods necessary for happiness it would
be superfluous to add good luck; for ‘when wisdom is present no good luck is
lacking to the one for whom it is present’ (Euthydemus 280b2–3). The idea here
is that the person with wisdom or knowledge will invariably make decisions or
choices conducive to his or her happiness. Just as the expert ship pilot invariably
makes decisions or choices conducive to getting to the port safely, given the
circumstances she is in, so the wise or knowledgeable individual will invariably
make decisions or choices conducive to attaining happiness, given her
circumstances. Many scholars believe that Socrates takes these choices to be