From the Beginning to Plato

320 FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO
should we take) what he believes to be relevant to the results of this particular
elenchos.
48 Again, I do not intend here to suggest that this is the conclusion Socrates thinks he
has established by means of his elenchos with Nicias at the end of the Laches. See
previous note.
49 To see how Socrates may have taken these two contrasts to be the same consider
Socrates’ example of the miner who produces gold. This expert can produce gold
successfully lacking knowledge of the good and the bad. But he can’t produce it
beneficially—that is, produce it in a way that will benefit him—if he lacks the
knowledge of how to use it, that is, if he lacks the knowledge of the good and the
bad. If we are to take these two contrasts to be essentially the same and we are to
take the knowledge or expertise of the good and the bad as the knowledge or
expertise that makes us happy and fare well—that is, virtue—then what is the
product of this knowledge? The good. In taking virtue to be an expertise we may or
may not need to view it as essentially productive. For important discussions
surrounding this issue see Irwin [9.34] and Roochnik [9.76].
50 Again, however, I hasten to point out that I do not take this to be the ‘hidden
meaning’ of the Charmides or the conclusion Socrates takes his elenchoi in the
Charmides to establish. See previous notes on the Laches.
51 Brickhouse and Smith [9.17], 6–7. Note that they prefer to translate technē as
‘craft’ rather than ‘expertise’. See also Reeve [9.73], 37–53, Woodruff [9.96], 68–
81, and Irwin [9.34], 73–7.
52 See Brickhouse and Smith [9.17], 37, Penner [9.69], 197, Penner [9.68], 321–2,
Ferejohn [9.24], 383 n. 18, Ferejohn [9.23], 15 and Irwin [9.34], 296 n. 28.
53 See also Republic 346a1–3 and Charmides 168b2–4.
54 Taylor [9.82], 84 glosses this as perhaps spinning, weaving, pottery and cultivation
of the olive.
55 See Protagoras 320e2–3.
56 See also Protagoras 331d1–e4, 333a1–b6, 349b1–c5, and
57 I owe the clear expression of this objection to C.C.W.Taylor.
58 On Socrates’ position as contrasted with Protagoras’ here see the debate concerning
the Socratic doctrine of the unity of virtues: Vlastos [9.87], 221–70 and 418–23,
Penner [9.67] and [9.71], Taylor [7.22], Irwin [9.39], 31–52 and 78–94, Devereux
[9.20] and [9.21], Ferejohn [9.23] and [9.24], and Brickhouse and Smith [9–17].
60–72 and 103–36.
59 Hippias Minor 365d6–366a4, Gorgias 509d2–e1, and Hippias Major 296a4–6. See
also the Prometheus story mentioned above in which Protagoras sometimes has
Epimetheus doling out the powers, for example strength and speed, and sometimes
the things in virtue of which the creature has a particular power, for example thick
hair.
60 See, for example, Republic 477d7–61 where Plato—as opposed to the Socrates of
the early dialogues—explicitly identifies knowledge (epistēmē) and belief (doxa) as
powers or capacities.
61 I say ‘typically’ because it is difficult to say what activities are associated with the
powers of the greater, the double, the heavier, the lighter, the older, and the
younger in the Charmides (168b-d), for example.
62 See Irwin’s A-powers (‘x and y have the same A-power when each of them does F
(where F is some kind of behaviour); each of them has the power to F’) versus B-