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From the Beginning to Plato

From the Beginning to Plato

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The argument assumes that a thought thinks. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, we saw that one<br />

confusion behind self-predication is <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>to</strong> distinguish between<br />

predications such as<br />

and<br />

(i) Man is eternal<br />

(ii) Man is mortal.<br />

If Socrates participates in <strong>the</strong> Form of Man, <strong>the</strong>n only (ii)’s predicate can be<br />

legitimately transferred <strong>to</strong> Socrates. But when from <strong>the</strong> proposal that Forms are<br />

thoughts Parmenides concludes that<br />

(iii) Man is a thought,<br />

FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO 341<br />

<strong>the</strong> predication is of <strong>the</strong> type that occurs in (i). So one who was clear about <strong>the</strong><br />

difference between (i) and (ii) would not take Socrates’ participation in Man<br />

<strong>to</strong>ge<strong>the</strong>r with (iii) <strong>to</strong> imply that Socrates is a thought.<br />

But such is Pla<strong>to</strong>’s inference. Now, Pla<strong>to</strong> certainly rejects <strong>the</strong> idea that Forms<br />

are thoughts, so he is probably making what he considers a sound objection<br />

against it. If <strong>the</strong> point of <strong>the</strong> TMA were <strong>to</strong> expose and reject self-predication,<br />

why would Pla<strong>to</strong>, in <strong>the</strong> midst of this demonstration, deliberately present a<br />

fallacious argument against a view he wants <strong>to</strong> refute, where <strong>the</strong> fallacy is of<br />

precisely <strong>the</strong> sort involved in <strong>the</strong> error of self-predication?<br />

But if Pla<strong>to</strong> did not abandon self-predication, how could he respond <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

Third Man Argument? By restricting <strong>the</strong> One over Many Assumption, <strong>the</strong> only<br />

assumption expressly given in <strong>the</strong> text. 38 Pla<strong>to</strong>nists in <strong>the</strong> Academy regularly<br />

limited <strong>the</strong> inference from a set of Fs <strong>to</strong> a Form of F <strong>to</strong> cases where <strong>the</strong> members<br />

of <strong>the</strong> set do not stand in relations of priority and posteriority; and, according <strong>to</strong><br />

Aris<strong>to</strong>tle, Pla<strong>to</strong> himself accepted this restriction. 39 Aris<strong>to</strong>tle reports this view in<br />

<strong>the</strong> Eudemian Ethics (1218a1–8):<br />

There is not something common over and above and separate from things<br />

in which <strong>the</strong> prior and posterior exist. For what is common and separate is<br />

prior (proteron) since <strong>the</strong> first (prō<strong>to</strong>n) is taken away when what is<br />

common is taken away. For example, if double is first of <strong>the</strong> multiples,<br />

multiple, which is predicated [of particular multiples, namely double,<br />

triple, etc.] in common, cannot be separate. For <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re will be [a multiple]<br />

prior <strong>to</strong> double.<br />

But double is <strong>the</strong> first multiple and cannot have a multiple prior <strong>to</strong> it. So <strong>the</strong>re is<br />

no Form of Multiple over and above specific multiples. The rationale for this

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