From the Beginning to Plato

FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO 101
of a concern that he should not stand out from the rest of them. Heraclitus’
observation that they might as well be hanged suggests not simply that they have
done wrong, but that their life will now be not worth living, and the city would
be as well off in the hands of youngsters.
The faintly anti-democratic sentiment of this observation accords well with
Heraclitus’ general estimate of the capacity of ordinary mortals to understand
what matters, and is borne out by some of his other reflections:
Have they any mind or intelligence? They believe the popular singers and
take the crowd as their teacher, unaware that the common people are bad
and few are good.
(B104) 101
Nevertheless it would probably be wrong simply to infer that Heraclitus is
expressing a standard prejudice against popular rule. We need first to discover
what it is that makes a man ‘good’ and why the rejection of such a man from the
city is a major disaster. Heraclitus’ view of who counts as good or worthy of
respect is developed along the lines of his own understanding of things. It is tied
up with his estimate of what gives significance to justice, and value to the things
that we ordinarily find choiceworthy in life. Value and significance depend upon
a context in which the good things can be recognized and appreciated: ‘It is
sickness that has made health pleasant and good, hunger satisfaction, toil release’
(B111). 102 We value these things precisely because they come as an exchange
from another situation, and it is the context of release from something unpleasant
that makes those conditions desirable and appreciated. The opposites are related
in such a way that we could not have the one without the other: release would
not be release from anything if there were no toil or pain to be released from. We
value it in those circumstances and in no others.
It seems to follow that having too much of these ‘good’ things can result in the
absence of any appreciable value at all. This probably explains Heraclitus’
enthusiasm for self-restraint: ‘It is not preferable for people to get whatever they
want’ (B110); 103 ‘Moderation is the greatest virtue, and wisdom is speaking the
truth and acting knowingly in accordance with nature’ (B112); 104 ‘All people
have a chance to know themselves and be moderate’ (B116). 105 But the real
answer is to find what has an eternal value and will never depend upon a
transitory context for its appreciation. There is only one source of such value that
Heraclitus recognizes, and that is the honour of virtue that achieves recognition
in everlasting fame among mortals.
The best choose one thing rather than everything: everflowing
honour among mortals; but the common people satisfy themselves like
cattle.
(B29) 106