Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
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Chapter 4<br />
For many of the examples, the semantic <strong>in</strong>formation contributed by the<br />
l<strong>in</strong>guistic expressions alone was only a weak <strong>in</strong>dication that presuppositional<br />
b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g was tak<strong>in</strong>g place. If the predicative role of the presupposed material and<br />
how the b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g relationship contributes to the coherence of the discourse are<br />
understood, then the only way to arrive at a coherent <strong>in</strong>terpretation is by b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
between the presuppositional expressions and the earlier <strong>in</strong>formation. This result<br />
seems to support Asher & Lascarides’ (1998b) emphasis on the role of pragmatic<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation <strong>in</strong> resolv<strong>in</strong>g presuppositions, at least for b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g examples. Until we<br />
have a clearer idea of how to determ<strong>in</strong>e when l<strong>in</strong>guistic expressions are referr<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
the same <strong>in</strong>formation, we can use our understand<strong>in</strong>g of how b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g would<br />
contribute to understand<strong>in</strong>g the rhetorical relationship between utterances <strong>in</strong> the<br />
discourse as collaborat<strong>in</strong>g evidence that we are deal<strong>in</strong>g with bound<br />
presuppositional <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />
The ability of the presuppositional expressions to have these extra discourse<br />
functions seems to be largely dependent on the type of semantic object that the<br />
trigger <strong>in</strong>duces.. The function of anaphors <strong>in</strong> context differs accord<strong>in</strong>g to the type<br />
of semantic <strong>in</strong>dividual they refer to as does the function of presuppositions.<br />
Anaphoric expressions that refer to concrete semantic <strong>in</strong>dividuals have an<br />
identify<strong>in</strong>g function, whether they identify an already given <strong>in</strong>dividual, or <strong>in</strong> the<br />
cases of set-relationship anaphors, an <strong>in</strong>dividual from a given set. The same goes<br />
for presuppositions of concrete semantic <strong>in</strong>dividuals. Triggers that presuppose<br />
concrete semantic <strong>in</strong>dividuals, e.g. a subset of the category identified by Zeevat as<br />
the referential anaphoric triggers and represented <strong>in</strong> the corpus by def<strong>in</strong>ite NPs, seem to<br />
serve either an identify<strong>in</strong>g function alone or <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation with the addition of<br />
more descriptive <strong>in</strong>formation. Zeevat (to appear) argues that the use of these<br />
triggers only helps to supply referents for predications and to l<strong>in</strong>k the descriptive<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g that they are associated with to the right semantic <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong> the<br />
discourse representation, i.e. “it is by no means clear that the role these referr<strong>in</strong>g<br />
expressions play <strong>in</strong> def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the thought expressed by the sentence <strong>in</strong> which they<br />
occur depends much on the content of their presuppositions.” (p. 9, Zeevat, to<br />
appear). Concrete <strong>in</strong>dividuals are generally <strong>in</strong> an identity relationship with their<br />
antecedents. Their correct resolution can contribute to understand<strong>in</strong>g the discourse<br />
structure but this is not their ma<strong>in</strong> function <strong>in</strong> discourse. Whereas triggers that<br />
<strong>in</strong>duce presuppositions of abstract objects can display extra functions more easily<br />
because the antecedent that they will be b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g with is also an abstract object.<br />
Because of the lack of <strong>in</strong>dividuation of abstract objects, the descriptive content<br />
conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the triggered presupposition can shape or delimit this object more<br />
than pronom<strong>in</strong>al anaphoric reference could, or more than concrete anaphoric<br />
references can delimit their antecedents. Also, because of the additional descriptive<br />
content we can create rhetorical effects by repetitions and other means that are less<br />
available with concrete anaphoric reference. For these reasons, I th<strong>in</strong>k the type of<br />
semantic object that the trigger <strong>in</strong>duces will support these additional functions, and<br />
<strong>in</strong> the case of abstract presuppositions, it supports these extra effects.<br />
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