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Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse

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Chapter 2<br />

because constra<strong>in</strong>ts on the acceptability of the discourse do the same task that<br />

clausal implicatures did <strong>in</strong> Gazdar’s approach.<br />

S<strong>in</strong>ce this earlier work there have been some new developments <strong>in</strong> semantics<br />

and semantic theories. Earlier theories of presupposition expla<strong>in</strong>ed their<br />

approaches <strong>in</strong> terms of semantic theories that treated mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a static way.<br />

Current popular approaches to presupposition are dynamic <strong>in</strong> that they use theories<br />

that consider mean<strong>in</strong>g to be the way <strong>in</strong>formation changes the context. The two<br />

ma<strong>in</strong> theories of presupposition popular today, the b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g theory and the<br />

satisfaction theory, are extensions of dynamic theories of mean<strong>in</strong>g, i.e. <strong>Discourse</strong><br />

Representation Theory and Context Change Semantics respectively. These dynamic<br />

frameworks help to solve some of the problems with earlier theories of<br />

presuppositional projection. The follow<strong>in</strong>g two sections <strong>in</strong>troduce these two central<br />

theories, and the extensions of them for treat<strong>in</strong>g presupposition, the b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g theory<br />

and the satisfaction theory.<br />

2.3 PRESUPPOSITIONS AS ANAPHORS<br />

The basic claim of the b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g theory of presupposition, first developed <strong>in</strong> van der<br />

Sandt (1992), is that presuppositions and anaphors are the same k<strong>in</strong>d of th<strong>in</strong>g and<br />

can be resolved by similar methods. Other developments of the theory are Geurts<br />

(1999) and (Kamp & Rossdeutscher, 1997). The theory extends <strong>Discourse</strong><br />

Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp & Reyle 1993) with a mechanism for<br />

resolv<strong>in</strong>g presuppositions and many of the ideas <strong>in</strong> the b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g theory are<br />

<strong>in</strong>timately connected with the philosophy beh<strong>in</strong>d DRT. In the next section, I first<br />

briefly present DRT followed by a detailed presentation of the b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g theory.<br />

2.3.1 <strong>Discourse</strong> Representation Theory<br />

DRT differs from earlier semantic representations such as predicate logic and<br />

Montague Grammar <strong>in</strong> that it is able to represent extended discourses because it<br />

permits a sentence by sentence <strong>in</strong>cremental update of the representation. In DRT<br />

we create a representation from the discourse and then we <strong>in</strong>terpret this<br />

representation with respect to a model. The process by which the representation is<br />

created and the process by which it is <strong>in</strong>terpreted are separate. The representation<br />

is thus essential for <strong>in</strong>terpretation. This is one of the key ways DRT differs from<br />

e.g. Montague Grammar and Context Change Semantics, which do not need an<br />

<strong>in</strong>termediate level of representation <strong>in</strong> order to be <strong>in</strong>terpreted.<br />

The key components of a DRT representation are - discourse representation<br />

structures or DRSs. L<strong>in</strong>guistic expressions <strong>in</strong> a discourse are decoded <strong>in</strong>to elements<br />

<strong>in</strong> the DRS representation. DRSs are made up of two types of objects, reference<br />

markers, which represent <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong> the discourse, and DRS-conditions which<br />

encode descriptive <strong>in</strong>formation about the <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong> the discourse, and look<br />

quite similar to predicates with the reference markers serv<strong>in</strong>g as arguments. A DRS<br />

can also be a condition.<br />

In <strong>in</strong>terpretation, the reference markers <strong>in</strong> the representation are associated<br />

with <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong> a model and the DRS-conditions <strong>in</strong> the representation represent<br />

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