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Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse

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Chapter 4<br />

collaborative evidenced we can look for to f<strong>in</strong>d plausible antecedents, is the subject<br />

of the rest of the chapter.<br />

4.3 IDENTIFYING ANTECEDENTS<br />

In the earlier discussion on anaphora it was po<strong>in</strong>ted out that depend<strong>in</strong>g on the type<br />

of semantic object an anaphoric expression refers to, the relationship between an<br />

anaphoric expression and its antecedent will differ, and the relationship these two<br />

have with the discourse structure will differ as well. But regardless of the semantic<br />

type, anaphoric expressions need an antecedent for their <strong>in</strong>terpretation, and when<br />

there is more than one compatible antecedent, the different <strong>in</strong>terpretations we get<br />

depend<strong>in</strong>g on the antecedent identified will have perceivably different effects on<br />

the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the entire discourse. This is where anaphors dist<strong>in</strong>guish<br />

themselves from presuppositions.<br />

Recogniz<strong>in</strong>g the antecedents of presuppositions is more difficult than for<br />

anaphoric expressions for two reasons, 8 both stemm<strong>in</strong>g from the fact that<br />

presuppositions are semantically more loaded than anaphors. First, look<strong>in</strong>g for an<br />

antecedent often <strong>in</strong>volves the difficult task of compar<strong>in</strong>g two different l<strong>in</strong>guistic<br />

expressions, often contributed by different speakers, and judg<strong>in</strong>g whether or not<br />

the <strong>in</strong>formation they contribute refers to the same object <strong>in</strong> the context. This is not<br />

always as straightforward as the examples given <strong>in</strong> section 4.2 make it seem – the<br />

more difficult cases will be discussed <strong>in</strong> the rest of this chapter. Second,<br />

presuppositions have the option of be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terpreted via accommodation. In some<br />

cases the difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation between b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g and accommodation was not<br />

readily apparent and this makes it necessary to justify the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the<br />

presupposed material as bound by look<strong>in</strong>g for additional grounds.<br />

Both of these problems are present to different degrees depend<strong>in</strong>g on the<br />

trigger type and the semantic type of the presupposition triggered. The<br />

presupposition of a concrete <strong>in</strong>dividual needs to be bound to its antecedent if there<br />

is one, but the case is less clear for the <strong>in</strong>duced presuppositions of abstract objects.<br />

This difference is illustrated most clearly by discuss<strong>in</strong>g the consequences of fail<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to identify a given antecedent for presupposed material <strong>in</strong>duced by the two ma<strong>in</strong><br />

trigger types, concrete and abstract presuppositions. If the antecedent of a def<strong>in</strong>ite<br />

description is <strong>in</strong>correctly identified or fails to be identified at all, a new discourse<br />

<strong>in</strong>dividual has to be accommodated, radically chang<strong>in</strong>g the discourse representation<br />

<strong>in</strong>to one that has different truth-conditions. On the other hand, if we fail to identify<br />

the antecedent for the <strong>in</strong>formation presupposed by an abstract trigger, such as a<br />

factive, this abstract object can be accommodated, and the consequence of the<br />

accommodation to the truth-conditional mean<strong>in</strong>g of the discourse representation<br />

will be difficult to p<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t. For many abstract objects it is quite difficult to<br />

determ<strong>in</strong>e if a l<strong>in</strong>guistic expression about it is referr<strong>in</strong>g to the actual object, to a<br />

part of it or a similar but different object if different l<strong>in</strong>guistic expressions are used.<br />

8 Some practical problems <strong>in</strong>volved identify<strong>in</strong>g antecedent of bound presupposition based on<br />

surface characteristics was presented <strong>in</strong> Spenader (2000)<br />

74

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