Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
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Chapter 5<br />
exam<strong>in</strong>e what the <strong>in</strong>formation was to the speaker and what purpose or role it<br />
served <strong>in</strong> the discourse. 4<br />
Presupposed <strong>in</strong>formation that the hearer has to accommodate could be<br />
shared knowledge, or hearer-old, or it could be hearer-new. If it is shared knowledge it is part<br />
of the common ground between the participants, but has not yet been expressed or<br />
made salient <strong>in</strong> the current discourse. Then it seems to perform a rem<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<br />
function, mak<strong>in</strong>g known <strong>in</strong>formation that is needed <strong>in</strong> order to provide<br />
background for non-presupposed <strong>in</strong>formation, perhaps mak<strong>in</strong>g the message more<br />
coherent. This potential function of presupposition is discussed <strong>in</strong> Del<strong>in</strong> (1995) and<br />
is often an implicit assumption <strong>in</strong> much discussion of presupposition.<br />
Another reason why shared <strong>in</strong>formation must perhaps be activated <strong>in</strong> a<br />
discourse may have to do with reason<strong>in</strong>g. Walker (1996) has suggested that logical<br />
conclusions cannot be made unless all premises are activated and available. If the<br />
discourse participants share an important element of background <strong>in</strong>formation<br />
which is needed as a premiss to support a conclusion, this <strong>in</strong>formation may need to<br />
be <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong>to the discourse first before the conclusion could be made. This<br />
could possibly be a role played by shared presuppositions <strong>in</strong> discourse, given that<br />
presuppositions are generally treated as background knowledge, i.e. <strong>in</strong>formation<br />
that is taken for granted, this seems to be an appropriate form by which to<br />
<strong>in</strong>troduce such <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />
Information that is hearer-known but discourse-new has a different status<br />
than <strong>in</strong>formation already given. The former is not activated at the time when it is<br />
used, whereas the latter might be. Most theories of discourse make a dist<strong>in</strong>ction<br />
between <strong>in</strong>formation that is activated or salient and <strong>in</strong>formation that is perhaps<br />
be<strong>in</strong>g retrieved from e.g. ma<strong>in</strong> memory.<br />
Presupposed <strong>in</strong>formation that must be accommodated could also be<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation assumed by the speaker to be hearer-new. The claim that some trigger<br />
types are clearly be<strong>in</strong>g used to <strong>in</strong>tentionally <strong>in</strong>troduce hearer-new discourse<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation as a major usage is still somewhat controversial, despite the earlier<br />
corpus work that has shown that it is a common use for the presuppositions<br />
associated with some triggers, e.g. see Pr<strong>in</strong>ce’s (1978) work on <strong>in</strong>formation bear<strong>in</strong>g<br />
it-clefts, and Del<strong>in</strong>’s (1995) work on it-clefts, as well as the many studies of def<strong>in</strong>ite<br />
NPs, <strong>in</strong> particular Fraurud (1990) and Poesio & Vieira (1998). This earlier work for<br />
the most part comes from written corpora. We know very little however about how<br />
frequent this type of usage is for spoken discourse, or for factives.<br />
Another generally agreed upon feature of presupposition is that, whether<br />
discourse-given, hearer-old or hearer-new, the presupposed <strong>in</strong>formation generally<br />
4 Conclusions we can make from the figures for accommodation are therefore very different<br />
from those we can make from the examples of b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, where we can assume that the annotator<br />
and the discourse participants were both aware of the <strong>in</strong>formation because it was discourse-given,<br />
and someth<strong>in</strong>g can easily be said about the function of bound presuppositions based on the<br />
transcript alone. The speaker’s message is not <strong>in</strong>tended for the annotator and the hearer’s<br />
<strong>in</strong>terpretation can differ from the annotator, so we need to try to determ<strong>in</strong>e what the participants<br />
meant and understood by look<strong>in</strong>g at other utterances.<br />
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