Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse
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Chapter 4<br />
Speaker C: *Presumably* (f)<br />
Speaker B: *Yes -*, it would be +non-surreptitious +(g)<br />
Speaker A: Yes, (h)<br />
but THAT wouldn‘t matter. (i)<br />
In the above example, four different speakers take part, and identify<strong>in</strong>g discourse<br />
segments was not totally straightforward. Here, different speakers ground the same<br />
utterance, e.g. it seems that (f), (g), and (h) all are ground<strong>in</strong>g (e), mak<strong>in</strong>g it one<br />
discourse segment. Utterance (b) is not grounded. Note that it overlaps with part of<br />
(c) and is not completed, be<strong>in</strong>g almost devoid of content, which is probably also<br />
why it is not recognized by the others. Here I have split Speaker A‘s utterance <strong>in</strong>to<br />
two utterances, (h) and (i), because (h) seems to solely have a ground<strong>in</strong>g function<br />
and belongs to the previous discourse segment, whereas (i) seems to be<br />
<strong>in</strong>formative, though it is not clear if this is the correct segmentation. Speaker A‘s<br />
abstract anaphoric reference <strong>in</strong> (i) seems to refer to the immediately preced<strong>in</strong>g<br />
grounded utterances (e) through (h), or could perhaps be considered to referr<strong>in</strong>g to<br />
only the grounded portion, (f) through (h), but clearly it refers to the fact that the<br />
record<strong>in</strong>g from the University of the air will be non-surreptitious. This aga<strong>in</strong> shows<br />
the problem of granularity. It is not clear what analysis is correct, though <strong>in</strong> both<br />
cases the abstract object anaphor derives its antecedent from an immediately<br />
preced<strong>in</strong>g utterance with<strong>in</strong> the proceed<strong>in</strong>g discourse segment. It is very unlikely<br />
that the anaphor could be referr<strong>in</strong>g to the discourse segment that makes up (a)<br />
through (d), because it would then be referr<strong>in</strong>g to the fact that they are disparates<br />
as well. Note that it THAT <strong>in</strong> (i) refers to the semantic contribution of (e) or (g),<br />
which is arguably the same situation. Therefore we can’t really say that it refers to<br />
(e) or (g), it takes as its antecedent the semantic <strong>in</strong>formation contributed by these<br />
utterances <strong>in</strong> the discourse representation.<br />
The general pattern seems to be that the discourse segment immediately<br />
preced<strong>in</strong>g the utterance with the abstract object anaphoric reference provides an<br />
antecedent for the abstract object anaphor, which <strong>in</strong> some cases can be <strong>in</strong>terpreted<br />
as referr<strong>in</strong>g to a semantic object derived from a larger segment than just the<br />
previous utterance. In most cases there is a core element that quite clearly forms<br />
the basis of the antecedent, but how much additional <strong>in</strong>formation is also <strong>in</strong>cluded is<br />
not def<strong>in</strong>itively determ<strong>in</strong>able.<br />
Let’s now look at a presupposition triggered by an aspectual verb that can be<br />
bound to <strong>in</strong>formation derived from the previous l<strong>in</strong>guistic context. The follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
example, the presupposition <strong>in</strong>duced has the synthesis of several utterances, made<br />
by several different speakers, plus world knowledge as its potential antecedent.<br />
Note that Speaker A and B (=Debbie) are married and Speaker d (female) is go<strong>in</strong>g<br />
to get married.<br />
(15) aspectual verb, triggered p: “people give you th<strong>in</strong>gs before (Marriage)”<br />
(2-10 927)<br />
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