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Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse

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Chapter 2<br />

(32)<br />

In the representation <strong>in</strong> (32) we resolved the pronoun <strong>in</strong> two steps, by first<br />

<strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g a reference marker, and then stipulat<strong>in</strong>g what other reference marker <strong>in</strong><br />

the representation it is identical with. What we can then later do is replace all<br />

<strong>in</strong>stances of z with y, and then remove z from the list of reference markers. We<br />

end up with a DRS that will have the same truth conditions as (32) above but one<br />

that is easier to read. In the follow<strong>in</strong>g I will use the more direct method of<br />

immediately resolv<strong>in</strong>g pronouns and other anaphoric expressions to the reference<br />

marker they are b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g with. Only where it is necessary for clarity will I show the<br />

step-by-step process of identify<strong>in</strong>g an antecedent.<br />

What are the truth-conditions of (32)? This DRS is true if there is a function<br />

between the reference markers <strong>in</strong> the DRS and a model of <strong>in</strong>terpretation such that<br />

the reference marker x is mapped onto an <strong>in</strong>dividual j <strong>in</strong> the model, and the<br />

reference marker y is mapped onto another <strong>in</strong>dividual b <strong>in</strong> the model, and j is Julia<br />

and b is a bicycle and j and b are related <strong>in</strong> such as way that j owns b and b is red.<br />

The DRS <strong>in</strong> (32) therefore has the same truth-conditions as its translation <strong>in</strong>to<br />

predicate logic, which would be the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />

(33) ∃x ∃y ( Julia(x) ∧ bicycle(y) ∧ owns(x, y) ∧ red(y))<br />

The important difference between the predicate logic formula and the DRSstructure<br />

is that the DRS-structure can be updated further with more <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />

The predicate logic structure cannot be <strong>in</strong>crementally changed because the variables<br />

<strong>in</strong> the structure are sealed off. DRT also has a semantics that allows its<br />

representations to be given a model-theoretic <strong>in</strong>terpretation. DRSs are <strong>in</strong>terpreted<br />

as partial models of the world. A DRS is true <strong>in</strong> a model if we can f<strong>in</strong>d real<br />

<strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong> that model that are <strong>in</strong> the relationship coded by the conditions given<br />

<strong>in</strong> the DRS be<strong>in</strong>g evaluated.<br />

There is a way to write DRSs <strong>in</strong> a l<strong>in</strong>ear format. This makes the<br />

representation a little more difficult to read but it takes up much less space and<br />

conta<strong>in</strong>s the same <strong>in</strong>formation so I will use the l<strong>in</strong>ear format <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Example (34) illustrates this format for the DRS given <strong>in</strong> (32), but with y<br />

substituted for z.<br />

(34) [ x,y : Julia(x), bicycle(y), owns(x,y), red(y)]<br />

20<br />

x y z<br />

Julia(x)<br />

bicycle(y)<br />

x owns y<br />

z = y<br />

red(z)

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