Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse

Anaphors and Bound Presuppositions
(17) "Someone lifted it (=the concept of transformations) from them"
(=mathematicians) (2-5a 615)
Speaker A: I mean every transformation word that I‘ve heard is in at the moment in
[dhi] course for mathematics.
Speaker B: That‘s right. Well, that‘s where it all comes from antecedent.
Speaker A: Yes. And it‘s {so} fascinating to see the analogy and it‘s much better in
the mathematics than it is in grammar, I think.
Speaker B: But it‘s us that lifted it from them, not vice versa.
Here, Speaker B has already pointed out that the concept of transformations
originated in mathematics, but seems to feel that Speaker A has not really
understood that. He therefore reiterates with a more forceful it-cleft construction
that linguists took the concept from mathematicians. Understanding that the
presupposition is already present requires understanding the similarity between “it”
all comes from (mathematics) = someone lifted “it” from mathematics.
The it-cleft construction is particularly well suited for corrections in that it
focuses one element and backgrounds the rest. Speaker A misunderstands or makes
the wrong conclusion from Speaker B’s statement, resolving that to grammar rather
than mathematics as Speaker B intended. That Speaker A has chosen the wrong
antecedent is clear from his next statement. If Speaker B had used a pronominal
anaphor rather than a presuppositional expression, there would have been a chance
of a further misunderstanding.
Bound presuppositions seem to be contributing additional discourse
meaning by serving a discourse function that pronominal or empty anaphoric
reference could not achieve because abstract object anaphors are dependent on
their antecedents. Presuppositions can contribute descriptive content to their
antecedents and thereby influence the perception of the concept referred to.
These types of examples are common with the abstract presuppositions in
particular because of qualities inherent in abstract objects. Because abstract objects
are not clearly individuated objects, the descriptive content of the presupposition
induced can to some degree shape or form the object. These types of
“manipulations,” such as reification and summarization, are made more possible
because abstract objects are less individuated and less delimited.
According to Eckert & Strube (2000), one of the most basic criteria for
information to be available for anaphoric reference is that the information has been
understood and processed by all discourse participants. One of the things that the
above examples had in common was that in each case it was unclear that all
discourse participants were aware of the information, induced by the
presupposition trigger, or aware of it in the way it is presented by the triggering
expression. As soon as the presupposed information is uttered, it is easy to pick out
what part of the earlier utterances contribute the same information to use as an
antecedent. But this information was not always an explicitly given object. This
means that many times presupposition triggers have the same referent-creating
ability identified in abstract anaphoric reference, but are more precise in their
reification abilities.
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