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Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse

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Chapter 2<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation that there is a bicycle and Julia owns it, and the entire content of DRS 2<br />

is negated, so it is <strong>in</strong>terpreted as say<strong>in</strong>g “it is not the case that there is a bicycle y<br />

that x owns.” Note that we are able to use the reference marker x <strong>in</strong> our conditions<br />

with<strong>in</strong> the embedded context, even though x does not appear as a reference marker<br />

<strong>in</strong> DRS 2. This is because x is accessible to the embedded context. A DRS has<br />

access to all reference markers <strong>in</strong> DRSs it is subord<strong>in</strong>ate to, which for DRS 2 <strong>in</strong> (36),<br />

this is only DRS 1.<br />

Conditionals create complex conditions, which we write as two DRSs jo<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

by an arrow. Information <strong>in</strong> these embedded contexts has access to all <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

<strong>in</strong> contexts that it is subord<strong>in</strong>ate to. Additionally, the consequent of a conditional<br />

also has access to the reference markers <strong>in</strong> the antecedent of the conditional. The<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g example illustrates how this works.<br />

(37) a. If Julia has a bicycle, it is red.<br />

(38) b. [1 x : Julia(x), [2 y : bicycle(y), x owns y] ⇒ [3 : red(y) ]<br />

Here aga<strong>in</strong>, a proper name ‘Julia’ <strong>in</strong>troduces a reference marker x <strong>in</strong>to the ma<strong>in</strong><br />

DRS, that is DRS 1. If creates an embedded DRS for the antecedent. Because ‘a<br />

bicycle’ is an <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ite NP, it <strong>in</strong>troduces a new reference marker <strong>in</strong>to the DRS that<br />

it is a part of, i.e. <strong>in</strong> the antecedent of the conditional. Here is where the condition<br />

that x owns y is added. The consequent of the conditional conta<strong>in</strong>s a pronoun<br />

which needs to be bound. It can be bound to a reference marker <strong>in</strong> a position<br />

accessible from where it is <strong>in</strong>troduced. Here this means every DRS that DRS 3 is<br />

subord<strong>in</strong>ate to, i.e. DRS 1. Additionally the antecedent of a conditional is also<br />

accessible to the consequent. Here this means that DRS 3 also has access to DRS 2.<br />

This means both x and y are accessible for b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, but because the pronoun it is<br />

only compatible with an antecedent that is <strong>in</strong>animate, y is the only possible choice.<br />

Disjunction creates two contexts,[ 1 [ 2φ] ∨ [ 3ψ] ] both of which are<br />

subord<strong>in</strong>ate to the ma<strong>in</strong> DRS. Unlike conditionals however, there is no accessibility<br />

relationship between [ 2 φ ] and [ 3ψ ] themselves, so [ 2 φ ] doesn’t have access to<br />

th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> [ 3ψ ] and [ 3ψ ] doesn’t have access to th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> [ 2 φ ]. 8 Modal verbs and<br />

attitude verbs all create modal contexts and attitude contexts that are written as<br />

embedded DRSs prefixed with the operator of their particular type. For example, a<br />

modal context is represented as a [ 1◊ [ 2 x : someth<strong>in</strong>g(x) ] ]. DRS 2 has access to<br />

reference markers <strong>in</strong> DRS 1 but not vice-versa.<br />

Accessibility is the crucial notion <strong>in</strong> DRT, especially for understand<strong>in</strong>g<br />

anaphoric relationships. This is because accessibility is what def<strong>in</strong>es what reference<br />

markers will be available for anaphoric reference. Accessibility is def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> terms<br />

8 This is actually a problem because we can have antecedents <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> φ and then picked up<br />

with an anaphoric expression <strong>in</strong> ψ without <strong>in</strong>felicity. For example: Either Julia’s bicycle is red or it is<br />

blue, is perfectly f<strong>in</strong>e and there is no problem <strong>in</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g that it refers to Julia’s bicycle. But<br />

<strong>in</strong> my data and <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g there are no examples where the special problems of disjunction<br />

need to be addressed so the <strong>in</strong>terested reader should see the discussion <strong>in</strong> (Geurts 1999).<br />

22

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