Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse

Accommodation and Presupposition
Here, for all models (or worlds if you prefer) where it is true that there is a King of
France, and if he is bald then he lives in exile, it is also true that if there is a King of
France who is bald then this individual lives in exile. The hearer is believed to
prefer the strongest reading because he assumes that the speaker is following the
Gricean Maxim of Quantity and saying as much as he knows. If the speaker had
meant the weaker reading, he would have chosen a different means of expression.
There are two main problems with using the IP to account for the proposed
preference for global accommodation. First, in some cases neither the local nor the
global reading is stronger than the other. Second, the reading that results from
global accommodation isn’t always the strongest reading. Geurts (2001) and Beaver
(to appear) have pointed out that the IP will make different predictions depending
on the type embedding. For example, Beaver (to appear, p. 36-37) writes “In the
cases of accommodation triggered by a presupposition in the consequent of a
conditional, or the scope argument of a universal quantification…” IP will
“…result in the preferences Global > Local > Intermediate. Note that the exact
preference resulting from a preference for logical strength will vary according to
the monotonicity properties of the embedding environment, so that, for instance,
the quantifier not every yields a preference Global > Intermediate > Local.” Thus, it
is hard to use the IP as an explanation for a general preference for higher levels of
accommodation.
Geurts (2001) concludes that in studying cases of presupposition projection
under several different types of embedding, it is not possible to find support to
differentiate between the BP or the IP. In many cases the IP will make the same
predictions as the BP, or there will be no preference predicted. However, advocates
of the IP have argued that it is a better explanation because it may be a more
general constraint on interpretation that applies to other structures, not just to
presuppositions. These other structures include reciprocals, discussed in Dalrymple
et al. (1991) and plural predication (Winter, 2001). If this could be shown, it would
make a stronger case for the IP. However, Geurts shows that while the IP may be
able to explain some other non-presuppositional phenomena, it clearly makes
wrong predictions when applied to other phenomena. In the end, we have no clear
way to determine if something like the IP or the BP is functioning and there seems
to be no clear advantage to either proposal.
Geurts (1999) gives two other potential explanations for the proposed
preference for global accommodation. 19 The first suggestion is that speakers will
prefer global accommodation because they will try to make the most relevant
interpretation they can and he gives the following example (Geurts 1999, p. 58).
(44) a. Fred didn’t bring his wife.
b. [ x, y : Fred x, y is x’s wife, ¬ [ : x brought y] ]
19 He also presents the IP.
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