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Presuppositions in Spoken Discourse

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Chapter 2<br />

2.4 THE SATISFACTION THEORY<br />

The ma<strong>in</strong> competitor of the b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g theory is the satisfaction theory. The<br />

satisfaction theory’s roots go back to ideas first presented <strong>in</strong> Karttunen (1974) and<br />

Stalnaker (1974) and was developed later most completely by Heim (1983). Others<br />

who have worked to develop the theory further are Beaver (1992, 1997). The<br />

satisfaction theory needs a very different k<strong>in</strong>d of semantics than the b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g theory,<br />

a semantics that allows for contextual update <strong>in</strong> a very different way than DRT, and<br />

this semantics actually grew out of the desire to try treat presuppositions. Examples<br />

of semantic systems with these properties <strong>in</strong>clude File Change Semantics (Heim<br />

1982), Veltman’s Update Semantics (Veltman 1996) or Dynamic Predicate Logic<br />

(Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991).<br />

In these semantic theories the mean<strong>in</strong>g of a sentence is the way <strong>in</strong> which it<br />

affects its context; i.e. the potential a l<strong>in</strong>guistic expression has to affect the context<br />

<strong>in</strong> which it is used. This is very different from the standard static truth-conditional<br />

approach to mean<strong>in</strong>g where the mean<strong>in</strong>g of a sentence is its truth conditions; that<br />

is, know<strong>in</strong>g what must hold for it to be true. Context change semantics also allows<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation update on a context without us<strong>in</strong>g any <strong>in</strong>termediate representation<br />

before <strong>in</strong>terpretation. Note that <strong>in</strong> this way it differs substantially from DRT, where<br />

a representational level is considered essential, and the representation is then<br />

<strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong> a model. It also means that a context change semantics doesn’t leave<br />

a derivational record of how the context was previous to each update. Each unit of<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation contributes to the already given context by updat<strong>in</strong>g it to a new<br />

context which conta<strong>in</strong>s the <strong>in</strong>formation, and no record of the derivation is kept<br />

because the theory doesn’t have a level of representation, and <strong>in</strong> fact considers it<br />

unnecessary. However, the lack of a level of representation is one of the reasons<br />

why the theory has certa<strong>in</strong> problems <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with presuppositions and also one<br />

of the ma<strong>in</strong> reasons why it is not an <strong>in</strong>tuitive choice for analyz<strong>in</strong>g presuppositions<br />

<strong>in</strong> natural discourse with an eye to eventually automat<strong>in</strong>g this process.<br />

The satisfaction theory as presented <strong>in</strong> Heim (1983) works <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

way, a context is a set of worlds and the mean<strong>in</strong>g of a l<strong>in</strong>guistic expression is its<br />

context change potential, its CCP. How does a sentence affect a context e.g. how<br />

will it affect this set of possible worlds when the sentence is added? Some worlds<br />

will be removed, i.e. all those worlds which are not compatible with the<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation contributed by the sentence and we end up with a new set of possible<br />

worlds, e.g. a new context. Given a context c, and a simple sentence S, then<br />

updat<strong>in</strong>g c with S, c + S = c’, where c’ is the new context conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g only those<br />

worlds where S is true. Look at one of the earlier examples aga<strong>in</strong>, given as (54)<br />

below:<br />

(54) S1: Julia has a bicycle. S2: Julia’s bicycle is red.<br />

If we beg<strong>in</strong> with an empty context c (i.e. the set of all worlds) and update this with<br />

the content of S1, (remov<strong>in</strong>g all possible worlds where Julia doesn’t exist and where<br />

Julia doesn’t have a new bike from the context) we end up with a new context c’.<br />

34

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