Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

ARE GOD AND HUMAN CREATURES FREE? 115
worlds semantics is taken into account and rather different lines of
reflection are drawn together. First, there is the historical question
whether there has been a possible world semantics in the medieval
period and this question may be linked up with the systematic question
whether certain views enjoy possibilities of systematic extrapolations
in terms of this kind of semantics. Second, different ontologies may
make use of the instrument of possible worlds semantics and
Hintikka's is one of them. At any rate 'the positions of Duns Scotus
and Leibniz, Hintikka and Plantinga differ substantially from one
another, but Goris links Leibniz, Hintikka and Scotus in a direct way.
His next step is the following one: "The crucial difference
between both models is that according to the statistical model the
actuality of the event reported by Pu excludes the possibility of its
non-occurrence, while Scotus' modal semantics does allow the
possibility that the event does not occur. According to Scotus, PIl & M
-PIl expresses compossibility, not contradiction. Genuine possibility is
what is logically possible. Scotus coined the expression possibile
logicum, for which non-contradiction is the only criterion. Assuming
that Knuuttila's interpretation of Scotus is correct, three objection~ can
be raised against his view" (260). Whose view is now 'his view'?
There are two possible interpretations. It might be Scotus' view or it
might be Knuuttila's view. At any rate both are wrong, but llow is the
argument set forth? Let us collect the facts.
Assuming that Knuuttila is correct Duns must be wrong, but
accusation that they did cannot be validated" (263), but apart from the point
whether Knuuttila be wright or wrong on some aspects of the development of
medieval thought, his views are definitely not an accusation, neither the one
way nor the other. Compare: "Also Vos criticizes expressly Scotus for
holding on to the necessity of the past in Lectura I 39 while rejecting the
necessity of the present" (261). Apart from the systematic issue whether a
specific contribution from the past be true or not, Duns does not hold on to
the necessity of the past in Lectura I 39 and that Lectura I 40,9 might indicate
that he does so is not quite clear. Thanks to the uncertain chronological place
of Lectura m the historical question is simply a difficult one and it might be
clear that Duns is simply in no need of being defended against Vos. Vos only
defends that Duns and the whole of the Augustinian tradition of medieval
theology is taken seriously.