Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

118 ANTONIE VOS
used in ordinary speech, no explicit mention is made of temporal
necessity. While leaving aside temporal modality, Aquinas
distinguishes a number of ways in which something is said to be
possible or to be necessary" (266).
An interpretation of modal notions in terms of noncontradiction
is called logical and syntactic, but with Aquinas this
interpretation is only secondary. For him logic is an analysis of
argumentative discourse. "Contemporary (formal) logic investigates
syntactic structures of otherwise uninterpreted linguistic expressions: it
uses variables for individuals, properties and propositions but it does
not regard the semantic content of the substitutions for these variables.
It interprets symbolic systems. Scholastic logic, however, deals with
semantically interpreted language. That is why Scholastic logic is
formulated metalinguistically and has a special interest in semantics.
The semantic riches of scientific language which it owes to the real,
actual world it is about, precedes the sterile structure of formalsyntactic
rules. This view on the place and function of logic
corroborates our thesis that the formal-logical interpretations of modal
terms are secondary" (271).
According to this view Aquinas' theory of proposition and in
particular his theory of the self-evident proposition has only to be
interpreted in terms of actualism. "Most scholars nowadays agree that
Aquinas' (mature) metaphysics focuses on the act of being and not on
a preceding essence which mayor may not happen to be exemplified.
That is why it is characterized as 'actualism" (272). Thus the famous
Thomasian distinction between esse and essentia is connected with an
'actualist' reading of Thomas' metaphysics. "The rival metaphysical
scheme, labelled 'possibilism', is associated with Scotus and Leibniz
and it is endorsed by 'possible worlds' theorists like Plantinga" (272-
273). Actualists are said to be Adams, Menzel and Burrell. Thus a
construed antithesis between medieval and modem logic is suddenly
linked up with an antithesis within medieval thought. There were two
basic rival metaphysical schemes and these rival schemes mirror a
basic difference between medieval and modem logic (272-273). I
myself cherish the idea that John Duns is a 'modem' thinker;
nevertheless this talk on "the sterile structure of formal-syntactic
rules" is entirely out of order, because such a formal syntax did not
exist in the Middle Ages and the role of algebra only started in the