Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

116 ANTONIE VOS
what is thus far said of Duns' view? Thus far only the compossibility
of a contingent event and its denial, on the foundation of the possibile
logicum, has been stated. However, the author himself did already
concede that the notion of purely diachronic contingency cannot
constitute the final solution: "Knuuttila says correctly that such a
strategy is philosophically unsatisfactory" (260).
We summarize the three objections:
The first objection states Goris's personal belief that a possible world
semantics implicitly assumes a B-view on time and therefore this type
of semantics does not acknowledge the reality of time. However, what
is the presupposition of acknowledging the reality of time? "Knuuttila
claims that "for an indeterministic theory it is necessary that
something (something that is or takes place) could have been or could
have happened otherwise at the same moment of time". That such a
(counterfactual) possibility must not only be attributed to the present,
but also to the past is not mentioned in so many words by Knuuttila"
(261). The objection tightly links not only synchronic contingency and
a possible worlds semantics, but also a denial of the reality of time, a
B-view on time and the theory that both past and present must be
necessary. "On Scotus' model, time also loses its reality" (ibidem).
Chronology must still occupy its logical priority.
"Knuuttila's model of diachronic possibilities fits in well with
our analysis of the Boethian interpretation of De Int. 9 (... ) and it
expresses the classical preference for an actualist over apossibilist
approach. However, what Knuuttila fails completely to see, is that a
certain form of determinism - one we labelled 'temporal fatalism' - is
already implied by the antecedent truth itself (fore-truth) of
propositions about future contingencies" (262-263).
For the moment I leave aside the truth or falsehood of the logical and
systematic statements in this objection and I only report what is
necessary in order to make the line of argument explicit. There is a
certain debatable interpretation of the ontology of a medieval thinker
and a rival theory states that a spokesman of that debatable
interpretation overlooks some necessary truths. Although the
conviction that these truths are necessary is precisely what is at issue
we might conclude that the errors of the interpreter count against the
medieval author. This is a remarkable working method. Here we have