Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

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116 ANTONIE VOS what is thus far said of Duns' view? Thus far only the compossibility of a contingent event and its denial, on the foundation of the possibile logicum, has been stated. However, the author himself did already concede that the notion of purely diachronic contingency cannot constitute the final solution: "Knuuttila says correctly that such a strategy is philosophically unsatisfactory" (260). We summarize the three objections: The first objection states Goris's personal belief that a possible world semantics implicitly assumes a B-view on time and therefore this type of semantics does not acknowledge the reality of time. However, what is the presupposition of acknowledging the reality of time? "Knuuttila claims that "for an indeterministic theory it is necessary that something (something that is or takes place) could have been or could have happened otherwise at the same moment of time". That such a (counterfactual) possibility must not only be attributed to the present, but also to the past is not mentioned in so many words by Knuuttila" (261). The objection tightly links not only synchronic contingency and a possible worlds semantics, but also a denial of the reality of time, a B-view on time and the theory that both past and present must be necessary. "On Scotus' model, time also loses its reality" (ibidem). Chronology must still occupy its logical priority. "Knuuttila's model of diachronic possibilities fits in well with our analysis of the Boethian interpretation of De Int. 9 (... ) and it expresses the classical preference for an actualist over apossibilist approach. However, what Knuuttila fails completely to see, is that a certain form of determinism - one we labelled 'temporal fatalism' - is already implied by the antecedent truth itself (fore-truth) of propositions about future contingencies" (262-263). For the moment I leave aside the truth or falsehood of the logical and systematic statements in this objection and I only report what is necessary in order to make the line of argument explicit. There is a certain debatable interpretation of the ontology of a medieval thinker and a rival theory states that a spokesman of that debatable interpretation overlooks some necessary truths. Although the conviction that these truths are necessary is precisely what is at issue we might conclude that the errors of the interpreter count against the medieval author. This is a remarkable working method. Here we have
ARE GOD AND HUMAN CREATURES FREE? 117 an instance of it. Knuuttila is wrong in many historical and systematic respects, but although Knuuttila is mainly wrong, Scotus must be wrong too, if we assume that Knuuttila's interpretation of Scotus is right. In fact the structure of the complicated first objection is the same as the structure of the second objection which is less complicated. First, a view of Knuuttila is reported: Knuuttila suggests that the scholastics were not aware of the difference between temporally indefinite and definite propositions. Second, this view is wrong: Boethius and many schoiastics following him, including Thomas Aquinas, disposed of this distinction. Boethius took into account that two contradictory propositions have to be temporally definite, if they are defmitely contradictory. "This motivated him to deny that propositions about future contingencies are 'defmitely' true" (263). Knuuttila's history of medieval modal theory is wrong, but nevertheless it is only assumed that he is right on Duns Scotus. The third objection is taken from an observation of Klaus Jacobi. "Jacobi argues that the relation which Aristotle and the Scholastics establish between modal and tense qualifiers is not a matter of defining modal terms but of using modal terms in an argumentation" (263). Thomas Aquinas' interpretation of necessity is that something will always be if it is necessary, and not the other way around, and that something cannot be impeded, if it is necessary. "He does not define modal terms extensionally with respect to periods of time, but intensionally with regard to the nature of things" (265). So Thomas defines necessity in terms of the nature of things. This is to be conceded. However, when Knuuttila speaks in terms of definitions he is wrong, but when the author himself speaks in terms of definitions it must be right. The modal model of the natures of things is the conceptual background of Thomas' concept of temporal necessity. According to general human intuitions and Thomas Aquinas the past and the present are necessary. The concept is at stake, because the term does not occur. "Also in those passages in which he discusses systematically the ambiguities in the meanings of the terms 'possible' and 'necessary' as
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Bestuur Prof. dr. H.A.G. Braakhuis
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8 H.I.M. SCHOOT cornerstone of any
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16 PIM VALKENBERG wanted to investi
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22 PIM VALKENBERG religions=", Whil
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24 PIM VALKENBERG in front of the H
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26 PIM VALKENBERG Aquinas remains b
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28 PIM VALKENBERG 2.3 The rules of
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30 PIM VALKENBERG of the subject-ma
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32 PIM VALKENBERG the Qur' än come
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34 PIM VALKENBERG encourage and str
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36 PIM VALKENBERG arguments are of
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38 PIM VALKENBERG The reference to
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44 PIM VALKENBERG Finally, we meet
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DE TOEGANG TOT CHRISTUS 61 SUMMARY
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64 M.A.J.M. BUIJSEN de natuurrechts
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Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

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