Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

More documents

Recommendations

Info

132 HARM GORIS that tenses are essential to propositions. The propositions 'Jones mowed his lawn', 'Jones mows his lawn' and 'Jones will mow his lawn' are different propositions, even if they refer to the same event by way of sentences uttered tomorrow, today and yesterday respectively. Consequently, the proposition 'That Jones mowed his lawn yesterday is now true' does not imply the proposition 'That Jones mows his lawn now was true yesterday'." To deny that propositions about future events that are causally contingent, have a determinate truth-status yields the problem of temporal fatalism: the future is as determinate, fixed, temporally necessary as the past and present are. With these three considerations in mind, it will be clear that the notion of synchronic contingency does neither help us to make the very distinction itself between past, present and future, nor (a fortiori) to allow for a distinction in modality between them or for a nondeterminate truth-status of propositions about future contingencies. Synchronic contingency makes no difference in the modal status of past, present and future. That Jones mows his lawn is equally synchronically contingent whether he did it yesterday, does it now, or will do it tomorrow. For in each of these three cases there is neither a logical nor a causal necessity involved. However, I want to claim that in the cases where Jones mowed/mows his lawn yesterday and now, temporal necessity is involved, but not in the case of Jones mowing his lawn tomorrow. Whether Jones will do it tomorrow or not, is temporally contingent. What is logically and causally contingent may be temporally necessary. Jones could have refrained from mowing his lawn yesterday or now, but he cannot refrain from it anymore. In my view, this difference in tenses cannot be reduced. In other words, a rephrasing in a counterfactual mode implies temporal necessity: counterfactuals depend on facts and facts are called in Latin facta, things that have been done. There are no such future things. It is very well (logically) possible to dismiss the three considerations I indicated above. But in my view, logical coherence is not the only criterion for sound philosophy. I think that philosophers also should Therefore I think that Dr. Vos' views on 'fore-truth' and .backtruth' (see his point 4.5.4) begs the question.
A RESPONSE TO ANTONIE VOS 133 take human intuitions very seriously. And the distinction in modality between past, present and future is such a common sense, basic intuition. For example, most people (if they are not atheists) do not think it is very problematical that God knows what happened yesterday or knows what is going on now. But they intuit there is something smelly when it is said that God also knows what will happen tomorrow. Even very astute philosophers cannot always free themselves from deeply rooted, human intuitions. Maybe Scotus is such a philosopher when he thinks the present is contingent because its alternative is synchronically contingent, but does not seem to be so eager to apply the same argument to the past. I hope to have made clear that systematically the notion of synchronic contingency does not affect the notion of temporal modality. Possibly I shall pursue in the future this discussion from a more historical viewpoint. 5 Recent studies by Normore and Sylwanowicz offer a good starting point for more historical research on Scotus' and Scotistic views on temporal modality: Calvin Normore, 'Scotus, modality, instants of nature and the contingency of the present' in: John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, Mechthild Dreyer (eds). Leiden etc. 1996, 161-174 and Michael Sylwanowicz Contingent Causality and the Foundations of Duns Scotus' Metaphysics. Leiden etc. 1996, esp. chapters one, seven and eight. It seems that while Scotus was reluctant to give up the necessity of the past, his followers were less hesitant and stated that the past was as contingent as the present or the future.
Page 2 and 3:
Bestuur Prof. dr. H.A.G. Braakhuis
Page 4 and 5:
Redactie Dr. H.J.M. Schoot (hoofdre
Page 6 and 7:
H. W.M. ten Have WIE KENT DE KRACHT
Page 8 and 9:
8 H.I.M. SCHOOT cornerstone of any
Page 10 and 11:
10 PIM VALKENBERG This wider perspe
Page 12 and 13:
12 PIM VALKENBERG the doctrinal aut
Page 14 and 15:
14 PIM VALKENBERG thoughts in the M
Page 16 and 17:
16 PIM VALKENBERG wanted to investi
Page 18 and 19:
18 PIM VALKENBERG Christian in the
Page 20 and 21:
20 PIM VALKENBERG hand them over to
Page 22 and 23:
22 PIM VALKENBERG religions=", Whil
Page 24 and 25:
24 PIM VALKENBERG in front of the H
Page 26 and 27:
26 PIM VALKENBERG Aquinas remains b
Page 28 and 29:
28 PIM VALKENBERG 2.3 The rules of
Page 30 and 31:
30 PIM VALKENBERG of the subject-ma
Page 32 and 33:
32 PIM VALKENBERG the Qur' än come
Page 34 and 35:
34 PIM VALKENBERG encourage and str
Page 36 and 37:
36 PIM VALKENBERG arguments are of
Page 38 and 39:
38 PIM VALKENBERG The reference to
Page 40 and 41:
40 PIM VALKENBERG almightiness - th
Page 42 and 43:
42 PIM VALKENBERG The first name wh
Page 44 and 45:
44 PIM VALKENBERG Finally, we meet
Page 46 and 47:
46 PIM VALKENBERG Christians in Spa
Page 49 and 50:
KOM EN ZIE WAAR IK WOON! Aantekenin
Page 51 and 52:
DE TOEGANG TOT CHRISTUS 51 geen bet
Page 53 and 54:
DE TOEGANG TOT CHRISTUS 53 het begi
Page 55 and 56:
DE TOEGANG TOT CHRISTUS 55 dan bij
Page 57 and 58:
DE TOEGANG TOT CHRISTUS 57 overtuig
Page 59 and 60:
DE TOEGANG TOT CHRISTUS 59 c) Een d
Page 61:
DE TOEGANG TOT CHRISTUS 61 SUMMARY
Page 64 and 65:
64 M.A.J.M. BUIJSEN de natuurrechts
Page 66 and 67:
66 M.A.J .M. BUIJSEN de eerste plaa
Page 68 and 69:
68 M.A.I.M. BUnSEN II, q.90 a.2c va
Page 70 and 71:
70 M.A.J.M. BUUSEN worden, is het b
Page 72 and 73:
72 M.A.I.M. BUIJSEN qq. 90-97,16 da
Page 74 and 75:
74 M.A.I.M. BUUSEN hebben bij het v
Page 76 and 77:
76 M.A.J.M. BUUSEN echter niet geze
Page 78 and 79:
78 M.A.J.M. BUUSEN vermogens van de
Page 80 and 81:
80 M.A.J.M. BUUSEN zij tot het geme
Page 82 and 83: 82 M.A.] .M. BUUSEN dat een wet in
Page 85 and 86: WIE KENT DE KRACHT VAN UW TOORN? Ov
Page 87 and 88: WIE KENT DE KRACHT VAN UW TOORN? 87
Page 101 and 102: kwestie' .20 WIE KENT DE KRACHT VAN
Page 107 and 108: WIE KENTDE KRACHTVANUW TOORN? 107 d
Page 109: WIE KENT DE KRACHT VAN UW TOORN? 10
Page 112 and 113: 112 ANTONIE VOS loyal to Saint Thom
Page 114 and 115: 114 ANTONIE VOS different (20). The
Page 116 and 117: 116 ANTONIE VOS what is thus far sa
Page 118 and 119: 118 ANTONIE VOS used in ordinary sp
Page 120 and 121: 120 ANTONIE VOS describe and to ana
Page 122 and 123: 122 ANTONIE VOS with the divine wil
Page 124 and 125: 124 ANTONIE VOS ancient Greek philo
Page 126 and 127: 126 ANTONIE VOS church and society
Page 129 and 130: AQUINAS ON NECESSITY AND TIME A Res
Page 131: A RESPONSE TO ANTONIE VOS 131 done-
Page 136 and 137: 136 THOMAS F. O'MEARA but this pres
Page 138 and 139: 138 H.W.M. RIKHOF continue. The thr
Page 140 and 141: 140 H.W.M. RIKHOF Peccatum" Joseph
Page 142 and 143: 142 H.W.M. RIKHOF (Hogeschool Holla
Page 144 and 145: 144 H.W.M. RIKHOF 7. Publications i
Page 146: PRlI'ITED ON PERMANENT PAPER· IMPR
show all

Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?