Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht
Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht
Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1997 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht
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132 HARM GORIS<br />
that <strong>te</strong>nses are essential to propositions. The propositions 'Jones<br />
mowed his lawn', 'Jones mows his lawn' and 'Jones will mow his<br />
lawn' are different propositions, even if they refer to the same event<br />
by way of sen<strong>te</strong>nces ut<strong>te</strong>red tomorrow, today and yes<strong>te</strong>rday<br />
respectively. Consequently, the proposition 'That Jones mowed his<br />
lawn yes<strong>te</strong>rday is now true' does not imply the proposition 'That Jones<br />
mows his lawn now was true yes<strong>te</strong>rday'." To deny that propositions<br />
about future events that are causally contingent, have a de<strong>te</strong>rmina<strong>te</strong><br />
truth-status yields the problem of <strong>te</strong>mporal fatalism: the future is as<br />
de<strong>te</strong>rmina<strong>te</strong>, fixed, <strong>te</strong>mporally necessary as the past and present are.<br />
With these three considerations in mind, it will be clear that<br />
the notion of synchronic contingency does neither help us to make the<br />
very distinction itself between past, present and future, nor (a fortiori)<br />
to allow for a distinction in modality between them or for a nonde<strong>te</strong>rmina<strong>te</strong><br />
truth-status of propositions about future contingencies.<br />
Synchronic contingency makes no difference in the modal status of<br />
past, present and future. That Jones mows his lawn is equally<br />
synchronically contingent whether he did it yes<strong>te</strong>rday, does it now, or<br />
will do it tomorrow. For in each of these three cases there is neither a<br />
logical nor a causal necessity involved. However, I want to claim that<br />
in the cases where Jones mowed/mows his lawn yes<strong>te</strong>rday and now,<br />
<strong>te</strong>mporal necessity is involved, but not in the case of Jones mowing<br />
his lawn tomorrow. Whether Jones will do it tomorrow or not, is<br />
<strong>te</strong>mporally contingent. What is logically and causally contingent may<br />
be <strong>te</strong>mporally necessary. Jones could have refrained from mowing his<br />
lawn yes<strong>te</strong>rday or now, but he cannot refrain from it anymore. In my<br />
view, this difference in <strong>te</strong>nses cannot be reduced. In other words, a<br />
rephrasing in a coun<strong>te</strong>rfactual mode implies <strong>te</strong>mporal necessity:<br />
coun<strong>te</strong>rfactuals depend on facts and facts are called in Latin facta,<br />
things that have been done. There are no such future things.<br />
It is very well (logically) possible to dismiss the three considerations I<br />
indica<strong>te</strong>d above. But in my view, logical coherence is not the only<br />
cri<strong>te</strong>rion for sound philosophy. I think that philosophers also should<br />
Therefore I think that Dr. Vos' views on 'fore-truth' and .backtruth'<br />
(see his point 4.5.4) begs the question.