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The convexity condition is simply a stronger form of <strong>the</strong> super-additivity condition. A<br />

transferable utility game is convex if <strong>the</strong> marginal contribution of each player increases<br />

with <strong>the</strong> size of <strong>the</strong> coalition <strong>the</strong>y joins. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, it is valuable to join a larger<br />

coalition than a smaller one. Convexity guarantees that <strong>the</strong> core is non-empty.<br />

2. Transferable Utility<br />

A game [N, v(S)] is a cooperative game with transferable utility is game where within <strong>the</strong><br />

coalition each player has <strong>the</strong> possibility to transfer any amounts of utilitymoney,<br />

including money, to <strong>the</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r player within <strong>the</strong> same coalition. In what follows, we<br />

adopt <strong>the</strong> following valuation function (Kaneko & Wooders, 2004)<br />

(1.0)<br />

In this setting, Ui : X % $ is <strong>the</strong> payoff function for player i, where X is outcome<br />

space for player i and where xi and are, respectively, <strong>the</strong> outcome and <strong>the</strong> endowment<br />

of commodities defined on <strong>the</strong> set X. In using <strong>the</strong> characteristic function in (1.0), we<br />

focus on transferable utilities where agents can transfer some utility and not necessarily<br />

compare utilities. It is assumed here that V(S) describes <strong>the</strong> Pareto frontier (For <strong>the</strong> proof,<br />

see Kaneko & Wooders, 2004.) In this case, <strong>the</strong> no income effects condition means that<br />

<strong>the</strong> sum v(S) is independent of <strong>the</strong> distribution of <strong>the</strong> money holdings among <strong>the</strong><br />

members of S.<br />

3.Transferable Utility and Side Payments<br />

To make up for any inequities that might rise due to <strong>the</strong> exchange in commodities and<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r between members of a coalition, we allow for <strong>the</strong> transfer of money from one<br />

member of <strong>the</strong> coalition to ano<strong>the</strong>r. Transfers of money between members of <strong>the</strong> same<br />

coalition, or “Side payments”, are a rule of <strong>the</strong> game and are not a prerequisite of <strong>the</strong><br />

utility function. The postulation of “side payments” is independent of <strong>the</strong> assumption of<br />

transferable utility (see for example, Luce ad Raïffa (1985.)<br />

In <strong>the</strong> following, we consider side payments in <strong>the</strong> context of transferable utility. Using<br />

<strong>the</strong> setting from (1.0), we represent a transferable utility with side payment as<br />

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