2010 ilerleme raporu - Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı

finances. But the earmarked funds of €500 million were underutilised, as only seven SMEs
had received credit guarantee support by 31 March 2010. The large informal sector which is
fuelled by weaknesses in tax and expenditure policies, as well as in law enforcement, remains
an important challenge. Turkey therefore adopted a comprehensive action plan to combat the
informal economy in 2009. Overall, the crisis slowed down or even reversed structural shifts
in economic activity. In spite of new initiatives by the Turkish government, the crisis has
complicated access to finance for SMEs.
State influence on competitiveness
There has been no tangible progress in the field of state aid. As transparency in the decisionmaking
process remains low, it is still difficult to judge the rationale and consistency of the
individual decisions taken. In addition, the scale of state aid and its importance in some key
sectors are likely to have increased substantially following the introduction of the various
fiscal stimulus packages. Adoption of the commercial code has again been postponed. The
absence of transparent monitoring of state aid and of supporting policies to reduce distortion
continued to have an adverse effect on competition and competitiveness in the economy.
Public procurement policies continued to be undermined by exceptions to the regulatory
framework. Overall, state intervention continued to be untransparent, which might have had a
negative effect on competition and competitiveness.
Economic integration with the EU
The openness of the Turkish economy, as measured by the total value of exports of goods and
services as a percentage of GDP, decreased to about 47.5% of GDP by the end of 2009, from
52.2% in 2008, largely in line with the crisis-led contraction in world trade. The EU’s share of
Turkey’s total trade increased from 41.4% in 2008 to 42.6% in 2009. Its share in Turkey’s
exports decreased from 48% in 2008 to 46% in 2009. While the EU’s share of Turkey’s trade
varies slightly from year to year, depending on numerous factors, including commodity price
trends and exchange rate movements, its decline in Turkey’s exports is likely to be the result
of relatively more subdued demand in the EU. Simultaneously, Turkey was somehow able to
diversify its exports towards other regions. The share of exports to African and Middle East
countries in Turkey’s total exports increased from 10% in 2008 to over 20% in 2009. FDI
inflows to Turkey from EU Member States remained very significant, growing from 75% of
the total in 2008 to 80% in 2009, thus illustrating the strong economic interdependence
between the EU and Turkey. Overall, trade and economic integration with the EU remained
high. Turkey was able to diversify part of its trade towards new markets, thereby partly
alleviating the impact of the crisis.
Incipient nominal exchange rate appreciation pressures were observed in the first half of
2010. In the year to July 2010, the exchange rate for the lira appreciated by 5% in nominal
terms against a basket of 50% US dollar and 50% euro. In real effective terms, corrected for
both producer and consumer price developments, the lira strengthened by 8%. Overall,
standard indicators suggest that Turkey’s export competitiveness has stopped improving.
4. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
This section examines Turkey's ability to assume the obligations of membership – that is, the
acquis as expressed in the Treaties, the secondary legislation and the policies of the Union. It
also analyses Turkey's administrative capacity to implement the acquis. The analysis is
structured in accordance with the list of 33 acquis chapters. In each sector, the Commission's
EN 44 EN