SENECA - College of Stoic Philosophers

EPISTLE LXVI.
succession of actions is woven, and a unity of life is
created, a unity which will proceed in a straight
course. Reason, therefore, is the judge of good and
evil ;
that which is foreign and external she regards
as dross, and that which is neither good nor evil she
judges as merely accessory, insignificant and trivial.
For all her good resides in the soul.
But there are certain goods which reason regards
as primary, to which she addresses herself purposely
;
these are, for example, victory, good children, and
the welfare of one's country. Certain others she
regards as secondary these become manifest ; only
in adversity, for example, equanimity in enduring
severe illness or exile. Certain goods are indifferent ;
these are no more according to nature than contrary
to nature, as, for example, a discreet gait and a
sedate posture in a chair. For sitting is an act that
is not less according to nature than standing or
walking. The two kinds of goods which are of a
higher order are different ;
the primary are according
to nature, such as deriving joy from the
dutiful behaviour of one's children and from the
well-being of one's country. The secondary are
contrary to nature, such as fortitude in resisting
torture or in enduring thirst when illness makes the
vitals feverish. "What then," you say; "can anything
that is contrary to nature be a "
good Of
?
course not ;
but that in which this good takes its
rise is sometimes contrary to nature. For being
wounded, wasting away over a fire, being afflicted
with bad health, such things are contrary to nature;
but it is in accordance with nature for a man to preserve
an indomitable soul amid such distresses. To
explain my thought briefly, the material with which
a good is concerned is sometimes contrary to nature,
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