SENECA - College of Stoic Philosophers

EPISTLE XCII.
fortune the wise man will be neither wretched nor
happy. And yet this also is incredible, nay, still
more incredible than the other case. For I do not
understand how, if virtue falls from her heights, she
can help being hurled all the way to the bottom.
She either must preserve one in happiness, or, if
driven from this position, she will not prevent us
from becoming unhappy. If virtue only stands her
ground, she cannot be driven from the field ;
she
must either conquer or be conquered.
But some " say
:
Only
to the immortal gods
is
given virtue and the happy life we can
;
attain but
the shadow, as it were, and semblance of such goods
as theirs. We approach them, but we never reach
them." Reason, however, is a common attribute
of both gods and men ;
in the gods
it is
already
perfected, in us it is capable of being perfected.
But it is our vices that bring us to despair for
;
the
second class of rational being, man, is of an inferior
order, a guardian, as it were, who is too unstable
to hold fast to what is best, his judgment still
wavering and uncertain. He may require the
faculties of sight and hearing, good he.-ilth, a bodily
exterior that is not loathsome, and, besides, greater
length of days conjoined with an unimpaired constitution.
Though by means of reason he can lead
a life which will not bring regrets, yet there resides
in this imperfect creature, man, a certain power that
makes for badness, because he possesses a mind
which is easily moved to perversity. Suppose, however,
the badness which is in full view, and has
previously been stirred to activity, to be removed ;
the man is still not a good man, but he is
being
moulded to goodness. One, however, in whom there
is lacking any quality that makes for goodness,
is bad.
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