SENECA - College of Stoic Philosophers

EPISTLE XCII.
ills do not make a man wretched, they consequently
allow him to be happy. For things which have no
power to change his condition for the worse, have
not the power, either, to disturb that condition when
it is at its best.
" But," someone will say, " we know what is
cold and what is hot ;
a lukewarm temperature lies
between. Similarly,
A is
happy, and B is wretched,
and C is neither happy nor wretched." 1 wish to
examine this figure, which is
brought into play
against us. It' I add to your lukewarm water a larger
quantity of cold water, the result will be cold water.
But if I
pour in a larger quantity of hot water, the
water will finally
become hot. In the case, however,
of your man who is neither wretched nor happy, no
matter how much I add to his troubles, he will not
be unhappy, according to your argument hence
;
your figure offers no analogy. Again, suppose that
I set before you a man who is neither miserable nor
I
happy. add blindness to his misfortunes ;
he is
not rendered unhappy.
I cripple him ;
he is not
rendered I
unhappy. add afflictions which are unceasing
and severe he is not rendered
; unhappy.
Therefore, one whose life is not changed to misery
by all these ills is not dragged by them, either,
from his life of happiness. Then as if, you say, the
wise man cannot fall from happiness to wretchedness,
he cannot fall into non-happiness. For how, if one
has begun to slip, can one stop at any particular
place ? That which prevents him from rolling to
the bottom, keeps him at the summit. Why, you
urge, may not a happy life possibly be destroyed ?
It cannot even be disjointed ;
and for that reason
virtue is itself of itself sufficient for the happy
" life."
But," it " is said, is not the wise man happier
if
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