Changing public space

grondexploitatie (Wigmans, 2002). In this case, the private sector buys part of the public space
from the local government in order to develop a new building. The municipality subsequently
uses this yield to finance the redevelopment of the remaining public space. Profits are thus
reinvested in the project in order to increase its quality. This approach, in which the private sector
contributes indirectly, is also known as value capturing (Priemus, 2005).
4.4.2 Free access
However, companies are not in business to solve public problems such as unattractive public
spaces. The only way the private sector can realise a good return on investment is by concentrating
on the bottom line. As Staeheli and Mitchell (2006) have discovered in their research, the
function as a public gathering-place is clearly secondary in privately owned areas like shopping
malls. The primary function of these spaces is to generate income, which is often obtained by
increasing the control at the expense of accessibility, also known as the security-profitability nexus
(Cybriwsky, 1999; Staeheli & Mitchell, 2006). According to Carr et al. (1992: 363), “… there is
typically a perceived conflict between the developer’s interest in bottom-line profitability and
the publicness of public space …”. This was also the conclusion of the inventory of all POPS in
New York. Although the zoning policy seemed successful with the addition of 500 new POPS, it
appeared that a large number of these spaces were either of marginal quality or did not conform
to the zoning requirements. Some were closed during specified opening hours; others did not
provide the promised amenities or posed strict entry restrictions (Kayden, 2000; Smithsimon,
2008). Meyer et al. (2006) also warn that such private spaces will only temporarily be publicly
accessible. They base their argument on the famous 1748 Nolli map of Rome, in which squares,
streets, and other public space (i.e., formal space) is indicated in white, and privately owned but
publicly accessible space such as churches (i.e., informal space) in grey. When comparing the
map to the current situation, it appears that most formal public space is still public, while most
informal space is not (Meyer et al., 2006).
The involvement of the private sector might thus create public spaces that are less widely
accessible than public spaces developed and managed solely by the local government. MacLeod
(2002), for example, has associated the entrepreneurial city with the so-called ‘revanchist city’, a
term coined by Neil Smith (1996). He argues that the two go hand-in-hand: because of private
investment and the focus on consumerist citizenship in the entrepreneurial city, vulnerable
groups such as homeless people are being disregarded and chased away. Although the revanchistcity
framework is very much derived from developments in New York (Smith, 1996; DeFilippis,
2004), MacLeod believes it is an important heuristic tool to also describe changes in the urban
landscape elsewhere. Several other commentators have also drawn attention to the exclusionary
effects associated with the regulation of public space. Some call it the ‘end of public space’
(Sorkin, 1992; Kohn, 2004); others identify a transformation of public space from open access
toward heightened control over access (Carr et al., 1992; Mitchell, 1995; DeFilippis, 1997). The
discussion can be placed within a wider debate on the increasing division of today’s post-Fordist
city and its exclusionary effects on some groups of people. Marcuse (1995) has defined this as
the quartered city, in which enclaves of wealth and power (‘the dominating city’) coexist with the
socially excluded (‘the abandoned city’) and other types of residential and economic ‘cities’ within
the city. Others have elaborated on this notion of a divided city and have introduced terms as
the fortress city (Davis, 1992), splintering urbanism (Graham & Marvin, 2001), and archipelago of
enclaves (Hajer & Reijndorp, 2001). The terms indicate a widespread erosion of public sympathy
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