Um Novo Modelo para o Setor Elétrico Brasileiro

Especificamente sobre o Brasil, o autor comenta 12 acima :
“Brazil, like California, faces an electricity crisis, and like California,
raises awkward questions and points to the cost of flawed and
inappropriate reforms. (…) The reforms, started in 1990, were given
more momentum by the Cardoso administration from 1994, and were
heavily influenced by the English model of unbundling, competition
and privatisation (with the possible exception of transmission).
The distinctive feature of Brazil that contrasts sharply with Britain is
that it is dominantly (95%) hydro-based with large multi-year storage
dams, and relatively recent access to gas, with an immature gas
network and market. In contrast to almost all other countries, the
long-run marginal cost of additional hydro investment is probably
lower than that of CCGT. In addition, dispatching the dams gains
considerably from basinwide coordination (allowing perhaps an
additional 20% firm power), while considerable rainfall fluctuations
mean that it is advisable to maintain adequate water reserves, or
face, as at present, severe and long-duration shortages when rains
fail and dams have been depleted. Finally, the dams are multi-use,
and managing them for irrigation and other water uses requires close
coordination between the water management authorities and power
dispatch.
These conditions are the least propitious for a competitive, privately
owned generation market. Investing in multi-use hydro-electric
projects that need coordinated regulation creates considerable private
investor risk. Dams are entirely front-end loaded, with negligible
running costs but massive investment costs. The gains from private
operation (once built) are thus likely to be small, and the risks that
prices will be held down in periods of tight demand high, while if
water is spilled, prices may fall almost to zero in a competitive
market. Investing in CCGT is equally unattractive, for although from a
least-cost system expansion view point, some low capital cost flexible
plant may be desirable, the financial economics look terrible. It would
only operate in drought years, and the overall load factor would
probably be less than 35%. Its average cost would exceed the LRMC
of hydro, and if hydro prices are suppressed in periods of shortage,
then the average price will be even lower, and hence unremunerative
without special payments for its role as emergency capacity or
reserve.
The uncomfortable conclusion is that it is unlikely that private
ownership of generation is an efficient way to plan, develop and
finance the generation sector in Brazil. It is an open question whether
it would ever be in countries requiring large-scale multi-use river
basis management schemes. The most favourable circumstances
would be for dams whose sole use is for hydro-electricity, and where
the price of electricity is set by thermal plant, as in Chile and
Argentina. Private involvement in generation has a comparative
advantage where timely construction and maintenance are required
to deliver possible efficiency benefits, but is least likely to work in
dominantly hydro systems.
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