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AFI 11-2C-130v3 - BITS

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<strong>AFI</strong><strong>11</strong>-<strong>2C</strong>-130V3 23 APRIL 2012 <strong>11</strong>7<br />

7.9.1.2.2. MAJCOM commanders in whose AOR the airfield lies.<br />

7.9.1.2.3. Senior operational commander on scene.<br />

7.9.1.2.4. PIC in compliance with MAJCOM directives.<br />

7.9.2. A hijacked aircraft carrying weapons of mass destruction will not be allowed to<br />

takeoff. Refer to DOD 5210.41M, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, paragraph 9B(3), for<br />

additional guidance.<br />

7.10. In-Flight Resistance. After airborne, success in thwarting a hijacking depends on the<br />

resourcefulness of the aircrew. Many variables of a hijacking preclude use of any specific<br />

counter-hijacking procedure. Some key factors should be evaluated before deciding a course of<br />

action to be taken, including the nature of the threat, danger to life or crippling damage to the<br />

aircraft in-flight, destination indicated by the hijacker, and the presence of sensitive material<br />

onboard. Some counter-hijacking actions the aircrew may consider are:<br />

7.10.1. Engage the hijacker(s) in conversation in an attempt to calm them and to evaluate<br />

what course of action might be effective.<br />

7.10.2. Dissuade the hijacker.<br />

7.10.3. Use facts or subterfuge to convince the hijacker intermediate stops are necessary.<br />

7.10.4. Propose more favorable alternatives, such as landing in a neutral, rather than a<br />

hostile, country.<br />

7.10.5. Exploit any reasonable opportunity to incapacitate or overcome the hijacker<br />

physically, including the prudent use of firearms.<br />

7.10.6. In any suspected or actual hijack attempt, the aircrew basic objective is to get the<br />

aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible and keep it there.<br />

7.<strong>11</strong>. Communications Between Aircrew and Ground Agencies. Crews facing a hijacking<br />

threat will transmit an in-the-clear notification of hijacking to ATC. If an in-the-clear<br />

transmission is not possible, set transponder to 7500. If unable to set transponder, or if not under<br />

radar control, transmit a radio message indicating transponder change to 7500. Notify ground<br />

agencies by any means available as soon as practical and follow-up with situation reports as<br />

circumstances permit. Covert signals are no longer to be used per FAA guidance.<br />

7.12. Forced Penetration of Unfriendly Airspace. Refer to FIH for international signals for<br />

air intercept.<br />

7.13. Arming of Crewmembers. When crews are directed to be armed by the mission<br />

execution authority, the PIC will determine which crewmembers will be armed (at least one<br />

flight deck crewmember and one loadmaster will be armed unless directed otherwise). All<br />

crewmembers should know who is armed. The following procedures apply when arming is<br />

directed:<br />

7.13.1. Weapons Issue. Before departing home station, obtain weapons, ammunition, box,<br />

lock and key. Crewmembers will be armed according to <strong>AFI</strong> 31-207, Arming and Use of<br />

Force by Air Force Personnel and MAJCOM publications. If an armed crew member must<br />

leave the crew enroute, transfer the weapon to another authorized crew member using AF<br />

IMT 1297, Temporary Issue Receipt.

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