SIERRA LEONE maq 4ª.indd - agrilife - Europa
SIERRA LEONE maq 4ª.indd - agrilife - Europa
SIERRA LEONE maq 4ª.indd - agrilife - Europa
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
price, which is higher than the market price, up<br />
to 20-40% higher in some cases (Chibnik 1978).<br />
In the case of Sierra Leone, a 10% difference<br />
was adopted since this is the prevailing price<br />
difference between local and imported rice when<br />
purchased in the rural areas. The assumption<br />
is that by relying on self-production farm<br />
households do not depend on imported rice<br />
to fulfil their needs (See section 3.5.2). In other<br />
words, this 10% adjustment in value comes from<br />
the fact that farm households prefer to secure<br />
their food and avoid risks and uncertainties of<br />
future unpredictable market economy.<br />
In the Neoclassical approach all units of<br />
time, whether in housework, wage work or<br />
leisure, are valued at their opportunity cost in<br />
terms of the market wage (Ellis 1993; Boadway<br />
2006). This means that marginal valuation of<br />
labour is equal to market wage. However this<br />
does not apply for the farmers operating in<br />
areas where labour market is limited/inexistent<br />
(Colman & Young 1989). According to Ellis (1993)<br />
it is more consistent and analytically useful to<br />
consider peasant households in terms of their<br />
only partial integration into the market economy<br />
and the incomplete markets within which they<br />
operate. In other words, following the second<br />
approach there are differences both in terms of<br />
the objectives guiding peasant behaviour and<br />
the impossibility to assume perfect competition<br />
in the labour markets. In fact, there is not only a<br />
practically non-existent or extremely constrained<br />
labour market but a complex institutional setting<br />
in which farm households rely for securing other<br />
forms of intangible goods and services (i.e. tacit<br />
safety nets) in a context of strong social (village)<br />
cohesion.<br />
The highly constrained or non-existent<br />
labour market means that the household<br />
labour cannot be effectively valued at market<br />
opportunity wage, thus, it is assumed to be close<br />
to zero. This follows earlier approaches already<br />
applied for similar cases and circumstances (cf.<br />
Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) and Little and<br />
Mirrlees (1974)). When there is no labour market,<br />
until the value of output riches the minimum<br />
subsistence level, the marginal valuation of<br />
labour is equal to zero, and leisure cannot be<br />
valued at any price (Coman & Young 1989<br />
p.156 top). On commercial farms (also defined<br />
as entrepreneurial farms, or capitalist farms),<br />
increases in labour input without concomitant<br />
income gains can lead to losses because profit<br />
equals output value minus outlay on materials<br />
minus wages, minus other payments (e.g. debtinterests,<br />
land rent). On family/peasant farms,<br />
however, increases in (family) labour inputs<br />
without corresponding increases in income do<br />
not necessarily lead to monetary losses because<br />
of the absence of wages. Thus, on family/peasant<br />
farms, valuing family labour as equal to the<br />
wages of hired workers is nonsensical (Chayanov<br />
(1920), on Chayanov theory cf. Chibnik (1989)).<br />
As suggested above (and explained in<br />
Section 3), there is an important social aspect<br />
that needs to be taken into account which is that<br />
farm households in Sierra Leone are extremely<br />
integrated at village and chiefdom level. On the<br />
one hand, property rights are not assured (but<br />
rather enforced by the authority of the Paramount<br />
Chief) and the land is frequently rotated due to<br />
the shifting cultivation system in place (thus not<br />
giving them sufficient motivation to put extra<br />
efforts33 nor invest34 in one specific plot). On<br />
the other hand, all assets are perceived to have<br />
a common value and are thus frequently shared<br />
between the villagers beyond the household<br />
33 According to survey evaluations by the Government of<br />
Sierra Leone (2007) “often farmer groups report very large<br />
amounts of labour to complete a given task, especially<br />
when the task was carried out by a gang or collective<br />
group. It may be that in these cases the task in question<br />
was completed in less than a full working day, or it may be<br />
that the pace of work in some groups is relaxed with the<br />
work treated as much as an opportunity to socialize as to<br />
get the job done, or simply that farmers just over-estimate<br />
and over-report the time taken”. In other words, issues of<br />
free riding may also be taking place at the village level.<br />
34 As stated earlier in Section 3, access to credit at the farm<br />
level is infrequent. First because to use land as collateral<br />
the individual would require the written permission of<br />
the extended family (the latter is an infrequent event)<br />
and second, all potential benefits would also have to be<br />
redistributed leaving the individual farmers with reduced<br />
return for its risk taking.<br />
Rural poverty reduction and food security: The case of smallholders in Sierra Leone<br />
81