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SIERRA LEONE maq 4ª.indd - agrilife - Europa

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price, which is higher than the market price, up<br />

to 20-40% higher in some cases (Chibnik 1978).<br />

In the case of Sierra Leone, a 10% difference<br />

was adopted since this is the prevailing price<br />

difference between local and imported rice when<br />

purchased in the rural areas. The assumption<br />

is that by relying on self-production farm<br />

households do not depend on imported rice<br />

to fulfil their needs (See section 3.5.2). In other<br />

words, this 10% adjustment in value comes from<br />

the fact that farm households prefer to secure<br />

their food and avoid risks and uncertainties of<br />

future unpredictable market economy.<br />

In the Neoclassical approach all units of<br />

time, whether in housework, wage work or<br />

leisure, are valued at their opportunity cost in<br />

terms of the market wage (Ellis 1993; Boadway<br />

2006). This means that marginal valuation of<br />

labour is equal to market wage. However this<br />

does not apply for the farmers operating in<br />

areas where labour market is limited/inexistent<br />

(Colman & Young 1989). According to Ellis (1993)<br />

it is more consistent and analytically useful to<br />

consider peasant households in terms of their<br />

only partial integration into the market economy<br />

and the incomplete markets within which they<br />

operate. In other words, following the second<br />

approach there are differences both in terms of<br />

the objectives guiding peasant behaviour and<br />

the impossibility to assume perfect competition<br />

in the labour markets. In fact, there is not only a<br />

practically non-existent or extremely constrained<br />

labour market but a complex institutional setting<br />

in which farm households rely for securing other<br />

forms of intangible goods and services (i.e. tacit<br />

safety nets) in a context of strong social (village)<br />

cohesion.<br />

The highly constrained or non-existent<br />

labour market means that the household<br />

labour cannot be effectively valued at market<br />

opportunity wage, thus, it is assumed to be close<br />

to zero. This follows earlier approaches already<br />

applied for similar cases and circumstances (cf.<br />

Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) and Little and<br />

Mirrlees (1974)). When there is no labour market,<br />

until the value of output riches the minimum<br />

subsistence level, the marginal valuation of<br />

labour is equal to zero, and leisure cannot be<br />

valued at any price (Coman & Young 1989<br />

p.156 top). On commercial farms (also defined<br />

as entrepreneurial farms, or capitalist farms),<br />

increases in labour input without concomitant<br />

income gains can lead to losses because profit<br />

equals output value minus outlay on materials<br />

minus wages, minus other payments (e.g. debtinterests,<br />

land rent). On family/peasant farms,<br />

however, increases in (family) labour inputs<br />

without corresponding increases in income do<br />

not necessarily lead to monetary losses because<br />

of the absence of wages. Thus, on family/peasant<br />

farms, valuing family labour as equal to the<br />

wages of hired workers is nonsensical (Chayanov<br />

(1920), on Chayanov theory cf. Chibnik (1989)).<br />

As suggested above (and explained in<br />

Section 3), there is an important social aspect<br />

that needs to be taken into account which is that<br />

farm households in Sierra Leone are extremely<br />

integrated at village and chiefdom level. On the<br />

one hand, property rights are not assured (but<br />

rather enforced by the authority of the Paramount<br />

Chief) and the land is frequently rotated due to<br />

the shifting cultivation system in place (thus not<br />

giving them sufficient motivation to put extra<br />

efforts33 nor invest34 in one specific plot). On<br />

the other hand, all assets are perceived to have<br />

a common value and are thus frequently shared<br />

between the villagers beyond the household<br />

33 According to survey evaluations by the Government of<br />

Sierra Leone (2007) “often farmer groups report very large<br />

amounts of labour to complete a given task, especially<br />

when the task was carried out by a gang or collective<br />

group. It may be that in these cases the task in question<br />

was completed in less than a full working day, or it may be<br />

that the pace of work in some groups is relaxed with the<br />

work treated as much as an opportunity to socialize as to<br />

get the job done, or simply that farmers just over-estimate<br />

and over-report the time taken”. In other words, issues of<br />

free riding may also be taking place at the village level.<br />

34 As stated earlier in Section 3, access to credit at the farm<br />

level is infrequent. First because to use land as collateral<br />

the individual would require the written permission of<br />

the extended family (the latter is an infrequent event)<br />

and second, all potential benefits would also have to be<br />

redistributed leaving the individual farmers with reduced<br />

return for its risk taking.<br />

Rural poverty reduction and food security: The case of smallholders in Sierra Leone<br />

81

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