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anyone, not just philosophers, seriously concernedabout the nuclear threat.~ 7. 65 ~Halperin, Morton. ?he Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling theMyth of Nuclear Strategy. Cambridge, MA: BallingerPublishing Co. , 1987. LC 86-32255. ISBN 0-88730-114-2.A former deputy assistant secretary of defense haswritten a strong critique of past and present U. S.policies on nuclear weapons. Halperin identifies whathe sees as many fallacies in recent strategic thinkingand suggests that the most important fallacy is thetendency to think of "nuclear explosive devices" asweapons that can actually be used in war.~ 7. 66 ~Harkin, Tom, with C. E. Thomas. Five Minutes toMidnight: Why the Nuclear Threat Is Growing Faster?ban Ever. New York: Birch Lane Press — CarolPublishing Group, 1990. LC 90-19405. ISBN 1-5597-042-5.Although the recent improvement in U. S. -Sovietrelations and the presumed end of the Cold War mayhave induced some observers to dismiss the nuclearthreat to a low priority concern, these authors, thesenior of whom is a Democratic U. S. Senator fromIowa, argue persuasively that the danger posed bynuclear weapons is still all too real and urgent. In theirchapter, "The Growing Threat of" Nuclear War, Harkinand Thomas expose the continuing dangers posed bythe spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations.In addition to sounding a warning, they also includeseveral provocative chapters in a section titled "AlternativeNational Security Strategies. " See. also 7. 80.+ 7. 67 ~Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. Expanded ed. NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1987. LC 86-31296.ISBN 0-19-504986-1.Herken conducted interviews with dozens of keypolicymakers and delved through many primary andsecondary documents in order to create this revealing,and frequently disturbing, historical study. Like Fordin 7. 62, he exposes the fact that, while our leaders havestated publicly that American nuclear weapons wouldbe used only in retaliation for a nuclear attack againstus, the actual war plans have called for U. S. tirststrikes. Herken also documentsthe role of "inter-ser-vice rivalry, " where the several branches of the U. S.military forces compete for shares of the defense budgetand for new weapons technologies, in driving thenuclear arms race forward.* 7. 68 *Kaku, Michio, and Daniel Axelrod. To Win a NuclearWar: The Pentagon 's Secret War Plans. Boston: SouthEnd Press, 1987. LC 86-. 27974. ISBN 0-89608-321-7pa.Recently declassifed Pentagon documents, manyobtained through the Freedom of Information Act, arethe basis of the authors' examination of secret U. S.nuclear plans from 1945 through the mid-1980s. Kakuand Axelrod assert that "These secret documentsdemonstrate in detail that, contrary to public statementsand widespread popular belief, in periods of crisis thePentagon has indeed threatened the use of nuclearweapons against Third World nations and has seriouslyconsidered launching a first strike against the SovietUnion. " (p. 3)*7. 69 ~Kaplan, Fred. 1he Wt'zards of Armageddon. New York:Simon & Schuster, 1983. LC 83-369. ISBN 0-671-42444-0.This is perhaps the best single historical narrativeof the development of American nuclear weapons policyfrom the end of World War II through the early 1980s.In-depth interviews with dozens of key figures, rangingfrom former secretaries of defense through retiredgenerals to still-active nuclear policymakers, enabledKaplan to produce a fascinating, intimate portrait ofthe key individuals and organizations responsible fornuclear war plans that reads almost like a novel. Ofparticular note is his account of the continuity inpersonnel and philosophy between the firebombing ofJapanese cities during World War II and early post-waratomic warfare policy. (p. 33-50) Kaplan also revealshow the ostensibly "scientific" basis of nuclear policymaking often masks personal bias and organizationalinterests; for example, claims that the United Stateswas dangerously behind the Soviet Union with respectto bombers and missiles, the so-called "bomber gap"of the 1950s and "missile gap" of the 1960s, respectively,were based on demonstrably weak and even deliberatelydistorted evidence, but led nonetheless to increasesin defense spending and nuclear weapon deployments.(p. 155-173)*7. 70 ~Kolkowicz, Roman, ed. The Logic of Nuclear Terror.Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986. LC 86-22317. ISBN0-04-497032-3 pa.During the last few years, there has been aplethora of books published on the subject of nucleardeterrence. This is one of the very best. Kolkowicz,in a chapter titled "Intellectuals and the DeterrenceSystem, " traces the evolution of a new academicspeciality, "nuclear strategists, " which purported to beGenocide and Modern War 141