The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

Preface
massacre, despite years of searches and a substantial forensic investment,
or that witness evidence supported any such number, as we describe
in the text below (Chapters 4 and 5). It is a curiosity, not only
because of the lack of evidence for the figure, but also because in most
massacre cases the initial estimates are exaggerated, and are subsequently
adjusted downward based on the cooler examination of hard evidence.
For example, at its peak, the early 9/11 estimates at the World Trade
Center in New York City reached as high as 6,886, but in the end this
was reduced to 2,749; 6 and the numbers put forward by NATO officials
in the spring of 1999 for the Kosovo Albanian dead or missing at Serbian
hands during the bombing war plummeted from 100,000 or more
to one-tenth that total and less. 7 The claim of “genocide” in Bosnia,
with an alleged 200,000 (or more) Bosnian Muslim civilians slaughtered
by 1993, was eventually cut down to less than 40,000, based on
the research of two different establishment sources. 8
This suggests that the Srebrenica total may have been uniquely immunized
against downward revision for reasons that have little or nothing
to do with evidence, and a great deal to do with political interest.
We certainly believe that there were a significant number of executions
at Srebrenica following the evacuation of the designated Srebrenica “safe
area” in July 1995. But we also believe that they may not have been
more numerous than the Serb civilians killed in the towns near Srebrenica
by Bosnian Muslim forces operating out of that “safe area” in the
prior three years (well over 1,000, with one estimate as high as 3,287 9 ),
or the number of Serbs killed in the ethnic cleansing by Croats in Croatian
Western Slavonia and the Krajina in May and August, 1995 (2,500
or more). We believe that the inflation of numbers and huge publicity
given to the Srebrenica massacre, and the avoidance of context and attention
to the actions and killings of others participating in the Bosnian
struggle, rests on political interest. That political interest has
profoundly influenced the focus of Western officials, the Western-organized
International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the Western-dominated UN, and the Western media.
The purpose of this volume is to raise questions and adduce relevant
evidence about the now institutionalized claims regarding the Srebrenica
massacre and to challenge the broader narrative in which it plays a major
role. This is an important task because this massacre has become a key
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