The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

Prelude to the Capture of Srebrenica
and the head of intelligence until the final months of the war, observes:
“The US approach to the war in Bosnia is torn by a fundamental contradiction.
The United States says that its objective is to end the war
through a negotiated settlement, but in reality what it wants is to influence
the outcome in favor of the Muslims.” 4
At a time when NATO’s historic mission had vanished with the collapse
of the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers were anxious to maintain
a major role in Europe, which meant a new role for NATO had to be
found. If the Yugoslav conflict was resolved diplomatically without the
U.S., the need for NATO would be further diminished and might be
replaced . by a European alliance (as originally envisioned by President
Dwight Eisenhower). Indeed, high-level discussions of the Western European
Union military alliance had been going on in 1992 between
Germany and France.
In Balkan Tragedy, Susan Woodward observes that “while the Bush
administration chose to abdicate leadership in the early stages of the
Yugoslav conflict, both the Bush and the Clinton administrations were
also unwilling to remain uninvolved, leaving the situation entirely to
Europeans. Whenever developments toward the Yugoslav conflict
seemed to challenge the U.S. leadership role in Europe, it stepped in.” 5
Despite the violence that accompanied the successful separatist campaigns
in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, senior diplomats believed that
war in Bosnia was avoidable. UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar,
former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and European Community
mediator Lord Peter Carrington all warned that diplomatic recognition
of armed separatist republics would damage chances of a peaceful settlement
of the conflict.
Germany’s plan to recognize Croatia and Slovenia was initially opposed
by the United States, until the Germans succeeded in pressing a
reluctant European Community to join them. At this point, the first
Bush administration, under pressure from the leaders of Saudi Arabia to
recognize Bosnia as a future Muslim-led European state, persuaded the
Europeans to extend diplomatic recognition to Bosnia on April 6, 1992
in return for U.S. recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. As in the cases
of Slovenia and Croatia one year earlier, this was done despite the fact
that no agreement had been reached on the question of independence
from Yugoslavia among the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats whose nations
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