The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

Securing Verdicts: The Misuse of Witness Testimony at The Hague
Radomir Markovic, the former chief of Serbian state security (listed
originally as K-34). Markovic had been arrested in Belgrade and held in
prison for several months during which time, as he explained, representatives
of the Serbian authorities would periodically meet with him,
and promise him freedom, a new identity and life abroad in exchange
for false testimony against Milosevic. To this astonishing revelation, the
tribunal expressed indifference, claiming that this was a purely internal
Belgrade matter. It obviously wasn’t.
The OTP had called Markovic as a witness based on the statement
he had made to the Belgrade authorities about freezer trucks, the concealing
of crimes in Kosovo and the burying and reburying of bodies.
In open court, Markovic renounced the Belgrade statement, declaring
that he had made it under duress The Hague tribunal, 60 but the trial
chamber took this disclosure of possible witness abuse very lightly. Since
there had obviously been extensive cooperation between Hague and the
Belgrade authorities, the tribunal was, at best, indifferent to, and, at
worst, an active participant, in witness coercion and/or bribery.
Prosecutors subject witnesses who fail to deliver the required testimony
to hostile attack. For example, Dragan Vasiljevic, the Serbian-
Australian, had been expected to testify that Serbian armed operation in
the Krajina were under the control of the Serbian interior ministry. He
testified to the opposite, namely, that the Serbian government was not
involved in Krajina’s affairs. Subjected to attack by the prosecution,
Vasiljevic declared that the statement attributed to him by the OTP had
little connection with what he had actually said: “I do not accept this
statement.” 61 The prosecutors attacked him ferociously in re-examination
and, according to Dragan, didn’t pay his airfare home.
Three Key Insider Witnesses
When it comes to the Serb small fry—some the actual perpetrators
of war crimes—the ICTY encourages them to point fingers at their superiors
and to work closely with prosecutors to construct the appropriate
narrative in return for lenient treatment. At the ICTY, the most
effective way of getting witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors is to indict
and then engage in plea-bargain negotiations. Since at the ICTY
conviction is a near-certainty, anyone under indictment has every incentive
to cooperate with prosecutors in constructing the appropriate
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