The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

Summary and Conclusions
from even larger-scale, U.S.-supported Croatian attacks on Serb populated
UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Western Slavonia in May (“Operation
Flash”) and the Krajina region in August (“Operation Storm”)
of 1995. Having undermined a UN-European Community agreement
that would have prevented the outbreak of war (the March 1992 Lisbon
agreement) and two other negotiated settlements (the Vance-Owen and
the Owen-Stoltenberg agreements) which would have ended the fighting
in 1993, U.S. State Department hardliners committed themselves
to imposing a military solution that prolonged the war until late 1995.
10. By facilitating the illegal transfer of weapons to Bosnian Muslim
forces and turning a blind- eye toward the entry of foreign Mujahadeen
fighters, the U.S. turned supposed UN-designated “safe areas” for civilians
into staging-areas for armed offensives against the Bosnian Serbs
and, later, a tripwire for NATO -intervention. Cees Wiebes, who contributed
a volume of analysis to the Dutch government’s 2002 report on
Srebrenica, notes that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency aided in the
transfer of illegal arms from Muslim countries to the Tuzla airport using
black Hercules C-130 transport planes and arranged for gaps in air surveillance
by AWACs which were supposed to guard against such illegal
arms traffic. 21 Along with these weapons came Mujahadeen fighters from
both Iranian Shiite training camps and al-Qaeda, including two of the
19 hijackers later involved in the 9/11 attacks—the official U.S. 9/11
Commission Report claims that Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar,
as well as the “mastermind” of the attack, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
fought in Bosnia, and that Osama bin Laden had offices in Sarajevo as
well as Zagreb. 22 Bin Laden himself was issued a Bosnian passport by the
Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Vienna in 1993, according to
the Bosnian Muslim publication Dani. Bin-Laden was observed on two
occasions at the office of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic. 23
11. Both U.S. and U.S.-appointed ICTY officials have acknowledged
the importance of political considerations in the issuance of indictments
by the ICTY. Thus, after issuing its first ever “genocide” indictments
for the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko
Mladic on July 24, 1995, 24 ICTY Chief Judge Antonio Cassese praised
the indictments as a “good political result” and noted that “these gentlemen
will not be able to take part in peace negotiations” 25 —a strictly
political consideration that nonetheless has failed to discredit the ICTY
283