The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

Preface
discussion with government ministers about the matter of the
Armija’s refusal to vacate the designated demilitarized area on
Mount Igman. But in spite of several difficulties Akashi remained
optimistic as he shuttled between Sarajevo and Pale,
and at noon in Sarajevo, or 1100 hrs GMT, on Saturday 24 December,
Jimmy Carter’s cease fire came into effect, and to practically
everyone’s disbelief it was respected by all sides….
And the credit for all of this, whether the International Community
liked it or not, went to Radovan Karadzic. If he had not
approached former president Carter in the first instance none of
this would have come about. It is very easy to argue that
Karadzic had ulterior motives for making this move, and that
had he not been under serious threat from Milosevic he would
never have even considered it in the first place. Perhaps this is
so but the inescapable truth remains that Karadzic set up the
process, followed it through by offering a string of unsolicited
concessions, managed amazingly to bring Mladic along with
him, and in signing the COHA [Cessation of Hostilities Agreement]
provided a very real opportunity for a lasting peace. Unfortunately
neither Izetbegovic or Zubak [Bosnian Croat leader]
were committed enough to take this opportunity at face value,
or prepared in the longer term to set aside their own individual
agendas. This would become apparent in the months ahead
when it emerged who had broken the COHA first. 17
In fact, preparations to resume hostilities, at least on the Croat and
Muslim sides, took place from the very outset of the COHA. The Commander
of UN troops based in Coralici near Bihac informed a French
logistics convoy that almost every night helicopters with supplies for
the 5th Corps were landing in the Bihac pocket. Although the Bosnian
Croats were meant to be abiding by the terms of the COHA, the Croatian
army was never withdrawn from Bosnia and indeed ECMM personnel
witnessed additional troops being deployed in the Livno valley
in west-central Bosnia during the period of the COHA.
In Tuzla, meanwhile, the SDA military commander objected to a
BSA Liaison Officer being stationed in the UN local headquarters.
When it was pointed out that the terms of the COHA specifically made
provision for this, he took things further by trapping the UN and the
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