The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

UN Report on Srebrenica—A Distorted Picture of Events
village of Visnica, began to retreat from Srebrenica as the small force of
Serbs which entered the enclave from the south on July 6, advanced
with ease. Nevertheless, Dutchbat units were ordered by the UN Force
Commander Rupert Smith to set up blocking forces against a Serb advance
toward the town. Unaware of the extent that the UN was being
manipulated, senior UN officials were puzzled by the actions of local
Muslim military leaders. The Fall of Srebrenica describes a morning
briefing of UN Special Representative Yasushi Akashi on July 10: “The
Force Commander assessed that the Bosniacs were in a position to defend
themselves, but instead were firing on the Dutchbat blocking position
and on the Forward Air Controllers. The Special Representative
concurred with the negative assessment of the Bosniac behavior” (para.
279).
Yet, under pressure from the U.S. and public opinion shaped by onesided
media reports blaming Serbs for any and all wartime abuses, the
UN ordered airstrikes the following day. These strikes by Dutch F-16s
did not stop the Bosnian Serbs from entering the town, as the large
force of the 28th Division had already retreated from Srebrenica along
with most military age males, to the village of Susnjari in the Northwest
area of the enclave.
Despite the clear indications that the Izetbegovic government was
prepared to sacrifice Srebrenica to force NATO intervention (see Chapter
2), the UN report declines to say so. Therefore, The Fall of Srebrenica
is unable to explain why the Second Army Command in Tuzla failed to
send reinforcements to assist soldiers of the 28th Division who chose to
fight their way to Tuzla rather than surrender in Potocari, where they
were offered safe passage with the women and children on buses provided
by the Bosnian Serbs. 42 Finally, the report is unable to explain
why retreating Muslim soldiers were apparently ordered to break out of
the corridor opened up by the Bosnian Serb Army and engage Serbian
forces instead of following the mountain roads which enabled thousand
of others to reach safety in Sapna finger near Tuzla.
An early indication of the larger picture surrounding Srebrenica
emerged on July 9, when Izetbegovic began sending letters and making
phone calls to world leaders, including U.S. President Bill Clinton,
charging “terrorism” and “genocide” at Srebrenica. According to the
draft of one such letter then in circulation under Izetbegovic’s name,
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