The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

The Military Context of the Fall of Srebrenica
Bosnia into a Muslim - Croat Federation and a separate Bosnian Serb
entity (ultimately, what was produced at Dayton in November 1995),
Izetbegovic stated while in Bonn that “If the Serbs do not accept the
[Contact Group] plan then we have no choice and must fight” (March
16). The next day, he reiterated this line (“We will not renew the truce
unless there is a political solution”) while adding that his SDA Muslims
“do not plan to start an offensive.” 27 At this very time, however, UN
monitors were already reporting thousands of BMA forces moving into
forward positions. On March 20, massed infantry attacks backed by artillery
were launched in an attempt to push the Serbs out of artillery
range of Tuzla, Zenica, and Travnik. Despite their new weaponry, the
BMA appeared to run out of steam in only two days, as the Bosnian
Serbs responded with volleys into all the towns. With these exchanges,
the COHA was effectively terminated. 28 Incredibly there was no condemnation
of the attacks from international politicians, even when it
was revealed that the Bosnian Croat army had also been involved in the
operation. The silence sent a clear signal to the Muslims and Croats that
they could carry on with impunity.
As O’Shea explains:
In the context of everything else that subsequently happened in
1995 it is vital, if not in fact critical, to understand that it was
the Muslims and not the Serbs who bore the responsibility for
shattering the comparative peace which Karadzic and Carter
had managed to cobble together less than three months previously….From
the Muslim perspective the COHA was just an
opportunity to regroup and rearm—nothing more, nothing
less. 29
Indeed, an interview with the Bosnian Muslim General Rasim Delic
published by the Sarajevo newspaper Oslobodjenje quoted him describing
UNPROFOR as a “millstone around the neck” of the Bosnian
Muslims. 30
The joint Bosnian Muslin - Bosnian Croat action went on for weeks
with infantry assaults and artillery barrages which were compared to
the tactics of the First World War, with similar casualty rates and relative
lack of territorial gain. The exception was in the Travnik area where
the BMA was driven back from 60 sq km. The BSA response was
shelling of Gorazde, Mostar and Konjic on March 24 and 25.
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