The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

The Military Context of the Fall of Srebrenica
From October on the focus was on agreeing to the terms of peace
which led eventually to a signing in Paris via a U.S. military base in
Dayton, Ohio, but even here, the Bosnian Serbs were humiliated. Their
own leaders were not allowed to represent them, with Radovan Karadzic
aid Ratko Mladic having been indicted in late July for war crimes and
even genocide, and they were replaced by Slobodan Milosevic, the president
of a different country—a point that the West had been prepared
to take up arms to uphold. Furthermore, when the chips were down,
Milosevic had not come to the assistance of either the Krajina or the
Bosnian Serbs.
Conclusions
Of necessity this has been a short review of the military events that
structured and conditioned the end of the war in Bosnia, but it should
hopefully have provided a context in which to place the fall of Srebrenica.
The tide of war was definitely already running against the Bosnian
Serbs. The ceasefire negotiated in December 1994 by Jimmy Carter represented
a good starting point to achieve peace. However, the Croatian
and Bosnian SDA Muslim leaders were committed to pursuing military
solutions whatever the costs to their own people—arguably slight
for the Croats, but disastrous for the Bosnian Muslims.
Though misguided and deplorable, this is at least an understandable
position for parties to a war. What is completely unpardonable is the
role of the Western powers and of the United States in particular that,
instead of being an “honest broker” supporting a negotiated peace, encouraged
the escalation of military violence and for longer than three
years actively undermined any peaceful solutions.
The double standards demonstrated by the West in their complete
lack of response to the Croat attack on Western Slavonia in early May
1995, on the one hand, and the air strikes following a relatively minor
infringement by Bosnian Serbs around Sarajevo in late May 1995, on
the other, were bound to increase the likelihood that the Bosnian Serbs
would see that only military “facts on the ground” would be recognised
and that the West was acting in bad faith.
Despite these pressures, the BSA exercised restraint and did not unleash
their weapons with the aim of causing maximum civilian casual-
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