The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

The Military Context of the Fall of Srebrenica
The Bosnian Serbs were under great and increasing pressure across
the country. This was compounded by rumours that the Muslims were
liaising directly with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to recognise
the independent state of Bosnia within the borders of the former republic
in return for the lifting of the sanctions on Serbia. In the Krajina
the Serbs were divided over how far to trust the Croats when considering
the proposals for extending the UN mandate.
A Republika Srpska assembly at Sanski Most head over the weekend
of April 15-17 saw a public spat between Karadzic and BSA Commander
Ratko Mladic over the recent reversals suffered by the BSA.
Mladic made it clear that he felt that the tide of war was flowing against
them fast, but the politicians refused to accept this. There were reports
that Mladic was influenced by the view from Belgrade where the population
had been impoverished by the severe international sanctions
causing one of the highest inflation rates ever recorded and fuel shortages
that had reduced people to buying and selling petrol by the roadside
from old plastic water bottles. 31
At this assembly it was also agreed to move as quickly as possible to
integrate the military and other resources of the Bosnian Serbs with
those of the Krajina Serbs—to “draw up a plan for the unification of the
two states,” as Karadzic expressed the decision at the conclusion of the
assembly. 32 The move was condemned by Croatia, the SDA Muslims
and the “International Community.” O’Shea puts it clearly:
What none of these people made any attempt to understand
was why the Serbs had found it necessary to band themselves together
in this manner in the first place. No one had made any
attempt to see the situation from the Serb perspective because
had they done so they would immediately have recognized that
the Serbs genuinely believed their backs were to the wall, and
that the whole world was set against them. And there were compelling
reasons for harbouring these beliefs….
The [BSA] were not the ones who broke the COHA, and they
were not the ones in daily violation of what remained of it, but
the Bosnian Serbs, both militarily and politically, continued to
be painted as the villains. In this scenario it mattered little what
Martic, Karadzic or any other Serb politician tried to say or do,
and they were all acutely aware of this. They decided to band to-
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