The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

Prelude to the Capture of Srebrenica
tinue the war as sanctions wore down the Serbs.
British diplomat Cedric Thornberry, Assistant UN Secretary General,
who personally investigated atrocities committed by each of the
warring sides, writes: “By early 1993, a consensus developed—especially
in the United States, but also in some West European countries and
prominently in parts of the international liberal media—that the Serbs
were the only villains, all through Yugoslavia, and that the victims were
overwhelmingly or even exclusively the Croats and Muslims. This view
did not correspond to the perceptions of successive senior UN personnel
in touch with daily events throughout the area; as a kindly soul at
the UN headquarters in New York, ear to the diplomatic grapevine,
warned me, take cover—the fix is on.” 32 These observations describe
the political and military climate that developed as events were unfolding
in Eastern Bosnia when Srebrenica first gained international attention
in 1993.
Naser Oric’s Reign of Terror
Most of the world first heard of Srebrenica in March of 1993, when
UN Sarajevo Commander General Philippe Morillon, acting without
the approval of his superiors, made a risky visit to open a humanitarian
convoy route to the city in Eastern Bosnia where fierce fighting had
been taking place between the predominantly Muslim forces of the
BMA and the largely Serbian BSA.
Despite Morillon’s willingness to take risks to help the Muslim civilians
who sought relief, the UN Commander was taken hostage by the
Bosnian Muslims as a way of publicizing a humanitarian crisis to force
Western military intervention. “The fact that they held me as a prisoner
in Srebrenica was orchestrated in Sarajevo,” Morillon later stated
in testimony at the ICTY. 33 It was Srebrenica warlord Naser Oric, Commander
of the 28th Division of the BMA, who received the order to
hold General Morillon as a hostage. “Naser Oric was a warlord who
reigned by terror in this area and over the population itself,” Morillon
observed, “[H]e could not allow himself to take prisoners. According to
my recollection, he didn’t even look for an excuse.” 34
General Morillon understood clearly that Naser Oric’s murderous
forays against Serbian villages and numerous civilian massacres since
May, 1992 were the reason that Serb military forces had blockaded Sre-
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