The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao
The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao
The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao
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<strong>The</strong> Military Context of the Fall of <strong>Srebrenica</strong><br />
supervised collection points which formed part of the heavy weapons exclusion<br />
regime negotiated in February 1994. At the same time British<br />
soldiers came under fire first from Serbs then Muslims as their convoy<br />
approached Gorazde.<br />
Lieut.-General Rupert Smith, the taciturn UNPROFOR commander<br />
who had taken over from the more communicative and even-handed<br />
General Michael Rose, made a rare press appearance to announce that<br />
unless all heavy weapons were returned to collection points by midday,<br />
May 25, air-strikes would be ordered “against the guilty party.” 44 It beggars<br />
belief that NATO jets would ever be ordered to bomb Muslim positions<br />
in Sarajevo whatever they did, and so in effect this was a threat<br />
to one side only—the Bosnian Serbs.<br />
Although the Bosnian Serbs had partially complied with the ultimatum,<br />
this was not judged sufficient and in due course two ammunition<br />
dumps near the Bosnian Serb headquarters in Pale were blown up by<br />
NATO jets on missions approved by UN Special Envoy Akashi. <strong>The</strong><br />
BSA responded by shelling all six safe areas. In Tuzla, 70 people died and<br />
130 were injured. A second wave of NATO bombing then destroyed<br />
another six BSA ammunition dumps. In Zagreb, the UN’s Akaski issued<br />
a justification for the bombing raids that sounded hauntingly Orwellian:<br />
“I decided I had no alternative but to respond to this dangerous situation<br />
that threatens the entire peace process,” his statement began. 45<br />
Now the BSA‘s response was to take UNPROFOR troops hostage<br />
and television pictures of “blue helmets” chained to strategic targets<br />
were soon flashed around the world.<br />
As Tim Ripley writes:<br />
It had all the hallmarks of a desperate last gasp by desperate men<br />
who knew the tide of war was turning against them. One UN<br />
intelligence officer called it an ‘expression of chaos’. <strong>The</strong> Croat<br />
attack in Western Slavonia and the perilous state of the [BSA]<br />
probably made Mladic desperate to try and keep NATO airpower<br />
from being unleashed against his army. Whatever the reason,<br />
the Bosnian Serbs played up the hostages for all they were<br />
worth, both politically and financially, but none of them were<br />
physically harmed. Indeed later it was learnt that many of the<br />
UN ‘human shield’ were only chained up for their video performances<br />
and Pale TV then made a small fortune selling the<br />
86