The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao
The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao
The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao
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CHAPTER 7<br />
UN Report on <strong>Srebrenica</strong>—<br />
A Distorted Picture of Events<br />
By George Bogdanich<br />
In November 1999, the United Nations issued a report titled <strong>The</strong><br />
Fall of <strong>Srebrenica</strong>. 1 Commissioned by the UN General Assembly 12<br />
months before, <strong>The</strong> Fall of <strong>Srebrenica</strong> purports to explain “why the<br />
United Nations failed to deter the Serb attack on <strong>Srebrenica</strong> and the<br />
appalling events that followed” (para. 3). As UN Secretary-General Kofi<br />
Annan announced with some pride in its Introduction, “having failed<br />
to act decisively during all of these events, the international community<br />
found a new will after the fall of <strong>Srebrenica</strong>,” as a “concerted military<br />
operation was launched to ensure that no such attacks would take<br />
place again” (para. 4).<br />
Despite the fact that this UN report was widely received as a serious,<br />
fact-based assessment of the “appalling events” conveyed by its title, it<br />
is deeply flawed—in its allegations, its research, its analysis, and its conclusions.<br />
This follows from the fact that <strong>The</strong> Fall of <strong>Srebrenica</strong> is first<br />
and last a political document rather than an unbiased search for truth.<br />
As with the work of the eminently political International Criminal Tribunal<br />
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the real purpose of <strong>The</strong> Fall of<br />
<strong>Srebrenica</strong> was to place the decade-long (and still ongoing) dismantling<br />
of Yugoslavia in a doctrinally acceptable light. 2<br />
<strong>The</strong> Fall of <strong>Srebrenica</strong> enshrines the famous “lesson of <strong>Srebrenica</strong>,” 3<br />
another iteration of the “responsibility to protect”—allegedly, the principle<br />
that any “deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel or<br />
murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary<br />
means, and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical<br />
conclusion” (para. 502). <strong>The</strong> “concerted military operation” to<br />
which Kofi Annan refers was known as Operation Deliberate Force, a<br />
UN-approved but NATO-executed bombing campaign against Bosnian<br />
Serb targets that began on August 30, 1995, and lasted until September<br />
14. 4 But, contrary to Annan’s tracing of Operation Deliberate Force<br />
back to <strong>Srebrenica</strong>, the incident that triggered NATO’s bombing campaign<br />
was the August 28 shelling of a crowded public marketplace in<br />
Sarajevo, killing 37, later shown to have been carried out by Bosnian<br />
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