The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

UN Report on Srebrenica—A Distorted Picture of Events
40 As The Fall of Srebrenica describes this story: “Some surviving members of the Srebrenica
delegation have stated that President Izetbegovic also told them he had
learned that a NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was possible, but
could only occur if the Serbs were to break into Srebrenica, killing at least 5,000
of its people. President Izetbegovic has flatly denied making such a statement”
(para. 115).
41 Krstic Trial Transcript, April 4, 2001 , ; and Krstic Trial Transcript, April 5, 2001, .
42 Zvonimir Trajkovic, “Srebrenica, lies and media games,” Ogledalo, Belgrade, June
22, 2005, .
43 “President Asks Clinton, Major and Others To Help Srebrenica,” BBC Monitoring
Central Europe and Balkans, July 11, 1995, translating a July 9, 1995 report
over Sarajevo-based Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina at 1800 GMT. Also see
“Bosnian president appeals for world leaders to help Srebrenica,” Agence France
Presse, July 9, 1995.
44 Carlos Martins Branco, “Was Srebrenica a Hoax? Eye-Witness Account of a Former
UN Military Observer in Bosnia,” March 4, 1998 (as posted to the website
of the Centre for Research on Globalisation, ).
Branco continues: “Another curious aspect was the absence
of a military reaction from the 2nd Corps of the Muslim army, which did
nothing to relieve the military pressure on the enclave. It was common knowledge
that the Serbian unit in the region, the ‘Drina Corps’, was exhausted and that the
attack on Srebrenica was only possible with the aid of the units from other regions.
Despite this fact, Sarajevo did not lift a finger in order to launch an attack
which would have divided the Serbian forces and exposed the vulnerabilities created
by the concentration of resources around Srebrenica. Such an attack would
have reduced the military pressure on the enclave.”
45 Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992 – 1995, Chapter 8, “Was ‘Srebrenica’
an intelligence failure?” pp. 355-421; here p. 370.
46 Ibid.
47 Martins Branco, “Was Srebrenica a Hoax?”
48 Quoted in George Szamuely, “Securing Verdicts: The Misuse of Witness Testimony
at The Hague,” Erdemovic Trial Transcript, IT-96-22, November 20, 1996,
p. 318, .
49 The UN Report even quotes Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had
“noted with some optimism ‘the close collaboration that has developed between
the UN and NATO with regard to the former Yugoslavia’. In particular, he noted
that the threat of NATO air power was effectively used to bring about a positive
result in the safe area of Sarajevo. He therefore concluded that ‘soldiering on in
hope seems preferable to withdrawing in abdication’” (para. 130).
50 See Sect. G, “Operation Storm and the United Sates-led peace initiative,” para.
432-437, of which only para. 433 and 434 actually deal with Operation Storm.
247