The Srebrenica Massacre - Nova Srpska Politicka Misao

UN Report on Srebrenica—A Distorted Picture of Events
in violation of the demilitarization agreement, although former Muslim
Commander Sefer Halilovic testified before the Hague that “in those
days, there were a large number of orders [from the Bosnian Army High
Command] for sabotage operations from the safe areas.” 38
Because the incident was well documented, the UN Report could
not completely ignore Izetbegovic’s shocking revelation to the Srebrenica
delegation at a Bosniak conference in 1993 that he had discussed with
President Clinton a scenario in which news of the death of 5,000 Muslims
in the Srebrenica area would lead to NATO intervention. 39 Because
a Dutch film with this information was shown at the Hague
Tribunal, this disturbing revelation is mentioned in The Fall of Srebrenica,
but the report simply cites Izetbegovic’s denial that the incident
happened and makes it a standoff, 40 although there were at least nine
witnesses confirming Izetbegovic’s words, including Srebrenica Police
Chief Hakija Meholjic.
While acknowledging that the “Bosniacs were numerically superior,”
the report makes a laborious effort to explain why the 28th Division, estimated
at “3000 - 4000” troops, would abandon Srebrenica on July 9,
two days before a force of merely 200 Serbs, supported by five tanks, literally
walked into the now-undefended town on July 11. Testimony
from Muslim military Commanders Sefer Halilovic and Enver Hadzihasanovic
indicates that there were more than 5000 soldiers of the 28th
division in Srebrenica prior to its capture, widening the disparity between
the Bosnian Serb forces and 28th Division. 41 Why didn’t the
vastly numerically superior Bosnian Muslim forces defend the city
against a small Serbian force which, at the outset, sought only to shrink
the size of the pocket to secure its supply lines, and cut the flow of
weapons from Zepa to Srebrenica? The Fall of Srebrenica opines that
“Command was fragmented, discipline weak, morale low, communications
and logistics were largely non-existent” (para. 230). Yes, this was
the predictable result when President Izetbegovic and his high command
deliberately removed the leadership of the same military unit that
once marauded its way across the Srebrenica-Bratunac region in
scorched earth attacks. But even factoring in these circumstances, Bosnian
Muslim forces clearly had the ability to defend the town.
Dutchbat military observers watched with dismay as the Bosnian
Muslim forces, which had recently launched an attack on the Serbian
236