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Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

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October 2011. The PDP and the UPL flouted this rule without serious repercussions,<br />

except perhaps at the ballot box. The electoral commission attempted to pursue legal<br />

action against the violating parties, but a judge dismissed the charges, highlighting the<br />

lack <strong>of</strong> enforcement power <strong>of</strong> the electoral commission (Zouari, 28 September 2011).<br />

Interpreting the Constituent Assembly Elections<br />

The NCA elections on 23 October 2011 provided the first real opportunity to evaluate the<br />

strength <strong>of</strong> the political parties, and as predicted, Ennahdha was the clear winner.<br />

However, many analysts did not anticipate the performance gap between Ennahdha and<br />

its secular rivals. Ennahdha captured 37% <strong>of</strong> the vote, while the next closest party,<br />

Congress for the Republic, won only 8%. Of all the parties falling short <strong>of</strong> expectations at<br />

the polls, the PDP’s poor showing came as the biggest surprise. The party captured only<br />

3% <strong>of</strong> the vote, despite supposedly being well positioned as one <strong>of</strong> the main opposition<br />

parties under Ben Ali. The biggest surprise success story may have been Al-Aridha, a<br />

party that emerged from nowhere to place third in terms <strong>of</strong> seat allocations.<br />

The distribution <strong>of</strong> seats between the parties is analyzed further below, but first, it<br />

is important to remember who the current NCA represents—half <strong>of</strong> all eligible voters<br />

who exercised their right to vote. Only two-thirds <strong>of</strong> those voters are now represented in<br />

the assembly by the party they selected. The other third voted for parties that did not<br />

receive enough votes to receive a seat in the NCA (Pickard 2011, 639). In other words,<br />

the current composition <strong>of</strong> the NCA reflects the will <strong>of</strong> approximately 34% <strong>of</strong> the voting<br />

age population.<br />

For this reason and others, Ennahdha’s victory does not lend itself to a clear-cut<br />

interpretation. Part <strong>of</strong> Ennahdha’s success owes to its grassroots network <strong>of</strong> supporters<br />

and apparently deep financial resources, as well as its reputation for being effective and<br />

capable <strong>of</strong> getting things done. Moreover, Ennahdha enjoyed the greatest level <strong>of</strong> name<br />

recognition throughout the country, due to its highly visible opposition to Bourguiba and<br />

Ben Ali, as well as its efforts to campaign in both rural and urban areas throughout the<br />

country. It was the only party to make a concerted effort to have a presence on the ground<br />

in all electoral constituencies (Churchill, 27 October 2011). Also important, Ennahdha<br />

98

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