Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...

Theoretical Literature
While there has been a considerable amount of scholarly attention, both theoretical and
empirical, dedicated to different post-conflict or post-transition constitutional processes,
they have led to little agreement on which prescriptions work best in order to ensure
peaceful and stable outcomes. This is primarily due to the fact that constitutions, by their
very nature, are not ‘one size fits all’ and will likely fail to increase stability unless they
are carefully tailored to their specific local contexts. That being said, a short discussion of
some of the agreed-upon points and highlighted trade-offs will help to frame an analytical
discussion of the process which Tunisia is currently under-going. While there might be
little agreement as yet about what specifics post-transition constitutions should aim for, a
more general conception of what constitutes a successful constitution is possible. Widner
describes the more uncontroversial attributes of a successful constitution as durability, the
ability to transform conflict from the streets and into institutions, the ability to protect all
citizens’ rights to participation and the inclusion of mechanisms that will allow it to
become self-enforcing (Widner 2008, 1515). While these ‘end states’ are fairly
uncontroversial, there is no clear cut answer about which procedural or substantive
factors aid their attainment. The procedural debate takes into account the different
impacts that different types of bodies and their operation can have on the success of a
post-transition constitution. Some of the procedural aspects that can have an effect are
degrees of transparency and public participation, the creation of an atmosphere of trust
and inclusion, and the electoral or other incentives of those serving on the constitutional
body (Widner 2008, 1517-20; Horowitz 2008, 3-20). Unsurprisingly, what these
proposed procedural variables have in common is their ability to affect how easy it is for
those drafting the constitution to favor compromise and long-term societal benefit over
selfish short-term gain. And still, there are trade-offs involved in even this limited list of
variables. For example, the degree of transparency and public participation can be both a
good thing, where it helps to create public trust, understanding and buy-in, and a bad
thing where it detracts from the task itself or encourages public posturing for subsequent
elections. This trade-off will be particularly relevant for the Tunisian example since, as
Horowitz notes, public participation and transparency are of particular importance where
83