- Page 1: Johns Hopkins University School for
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- Page 10: PDP PSD RCD SAVAK Parti Démocrate
- Page 13 and 14: Introduction: Tunisia Report I. Wil
- Page 15 and 16: a moderate Islamist movement, the R
- Page 17: Part I: Revolution and Identity 5
- Page 20 and 21: existed for years prior to December
- Page 22 and 23: degrees. With such a large number o
- Page 24 and 25: crackdown in Gafsa on peaceful prot
- Page 27 and 28: Defining the Uprising Malikat Rufai
- Page 29 and 30: Civil Disobedience “Under a gover
- Page 31 and 32: eing done under Ben Ali to alleviat
- Page 33 and 34: Interviews with Professor Hafaiedh
- Page 35 and 36: Ben Ali continued in this vein, and
- Page 37: Radwan Masmoudi (SAIS Group Meeting
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- Page 42 and 43: Number of Private Businesses by Reg
- Page 44 and 45: Tunis picked Ennahdha as their favo
- Page 46 and 47: Almost all Tunisians agree that the
- Page 49 and 50: Tunisia: The Role of Secularism Jen
- Page 51 and 52: Destour party, was the party of Ben
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have an organizational mechanism wi
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Laïque Secularism Laïque seculari
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movement, which would be similar to
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counter-weight to possible incursio
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Ghannouchi defines his mission, is
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announced that he is opposed to sta
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neither enforced nor forbidden. The
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secular or Islamist in Tunisia toda
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A Warning for the Future Many of th
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legal regulations against potential
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desires of the opposition. Tellingl
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initiative (Brand 1998, 193). Both
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imperceptibly over time. In many wa
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immediately and loudly condemn acti
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Ghannouchi, meanwhile, seems to bel
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etter showing than the leftist part
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people in this country, and then yo
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Part II: Elections and the Constitu
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more broadly, to identify potential
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the main obstacle to be overcome is
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(IFES) polling data from May 2011,
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demonstrated by the “Persepolis s
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There remain, however, many reasons
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observation and analysis of the res
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multiparty elections may reflect a
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Unlike the smaller parties, the maj
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October 2011. The PDP and the UPL f
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the PDP, its lavish spending on ove
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Islamist threat. The problem is tha
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104
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dealing with the fundamentalists. T
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that Ennahdha has a totalitarian pr
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In this framework, the reference to
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Lastly, the opaque role of the Gulf
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114
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as a conduit for citizens’ intere
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on Associations (Law 154 of 1959 as
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exclusively around their studies, b
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strong relationships across organiz
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Recommendations Moving Forward To I
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126
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October, something happened to disc
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Issues Unaddressed Talking with you
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known what it’s like to live in a
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mentioned earlier, a high number of
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to bridge the gap and draw in these
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openly sharing in the media their p
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140
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142
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professionalism. Although never lav
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Ammar’s remarks do provide a help
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Social Science Forum 2012) Similar
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Abdelkrim Zbidi, was a medical doct
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modernization of its existing force
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accounted for the majority of the f
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also complicated, involving a compl
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their extortion, the price of which
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trust and confidence in a populatio
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etraining expenses are accounted fo
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wrongs done them under the former r
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intermediary preventing the Ennahdh
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managing to retain power, is one th
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sided with them, could not be more
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There is a case to be made that Ben
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174
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graduates are even bleaker; the num
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focus on these political processes,
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As Tunisia led the movement, its de
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The low levels of foreign direct in
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activities. The strategy should als
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186
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economy continues to improve. Unfor
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Despite these positive forecasts, t
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graduates work in the public sector
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een an increased need for labor in
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of roads to bringing electricity to
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Political actors in Tunisia have ex
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country to expand its agricultural
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What the U.S. has Promised Tunisia
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U.S. assistance will be able to sup
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equesting that other institutions s
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Under the post-colonial regimes of
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Another delicate issue that the Con
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a global market may lie in the pres
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Revolution” will depend on the ef
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• After the Tunisian Vote: Analyz
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Monday 23 January • Ben Ezzine Mu
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• Habib Slim, Professor Emeritus
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Associated Press. 15 February 2012.
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Gouvernement du Québec Ministère
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Powell, Kimberly. 2011. “Framing
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Tunisia Live. 1 December 2011. “T