Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Tunisia: Understanding Conflict 2012 - Johns Hopkins School of ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Those released therefore included political prisoners from all strata <strong>of</strong> society and<br />
holding all political views—including a number <strong>of</strong> salafi adherents. However, it is<br />
important to note that the amnesty did not include those imprisoned on criminal<br />
charges—including for those individuals who claimed the evidence against them had<br />
been fabricated by the regime. These individuals consider themselves as political<br />
prisoners and several have demanded retrial or release.<br />
Consensus amongst the <strong>Tunisia</strong>n people appears still to be that the political<br />
amnesty itself was necessary, as was its all-encompassing nature; to understand why, it is<br />
important to grasp the interrelationship <strong>of</strong> the religious and the political in opposition to<br />
the regime in its latter years.<br />
To <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns, theirs is not the “Jasmine Revolution.” Rather, it is known in the<br />
country as the Revolution <strong>of</strong> Liberty and Human Dignity, a much l<strong>of</strong>tier title but one<br />
which carries with it a creed specifically in opposition to the repressions imposed on the<br />
<strong>Tunisia</strong>n people by the Ben Ali regime—suppression <strong>of</strong> their freedom <strong>of</strong> speech, <strong>of</strong> many<br />
<strong>of</strong> their social and commercial freedoms, and, crucially, <strong>of</strong> many <strong>of</strong> the behaviors<br />
<strong>Tunisia</strong>ns associate with the practice <strong>of</strong> their religion.<br />
It is within this context then—a context that includes acts such as banning the<br />
wearing <strong>of</strong> the headscarf in schools and universities, acts that were conducted under the<br />
mantle <strong>of</strong> President Bourguiba’s aggressive secularization policies, and interpreted<br />
strongly as anti-Islamic and contrary to the wishes <strong>of</strong> the vast majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>Tunisia</strong>ns—that<br />
the role <strong>of</strong> Islamist groups in <strong>Tunisia</strong> must be considered. North Africa’s history with<br />
Islamist political groups has been turbulent and violent for much <strong>of</strong> the past three<br />
decades. While Algeria stands as the most dramatic example—one not lost on <strong>Tunisia</strong>,<br />
both government and people—Morocco, Egypt, Libya and <strong>Tunisia</strong> have all seen political<br />
opposition be funneled through groups that, in addition to taking on a strong traditional<br />
identification with Islam, have specific political ambitions, with regime change as their<br />
ultimate goal.<br />
For Ben Ali, the Western attitude <strong>of</strong> fear and distrust towards Islamic-based<br />
political organizations—particularly armed ones, unsurprisingly—created the opportunity<br />
for the former President to place himself, in the minds <strong>of</strong> Western leaders, as the<br />
165